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Since the global financial dramas of 2008-09,
authorities on financial regulation have come increasingly
to counsel the inclusion of macroprudential policy
instruments in the standard 'toolkit' offinance-regulatory
measures employed by financial supervisors. The
hallmark of this perspective is its focus not simply on the
safety and soundness of individualfinancial institutions, as
is characteristic of the traditional 'microprudential'
perspective, but also on certain structural features of
financial systems that can imperil such systems as wholes.
Systemic financial stability' thus comes to supplement,
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though not to supplant, institutional 'safety and
soundness' as a regulatory desideratum.
The move from primarily micro- to combined micro-
and macroprudential finance-regulatory regimes is surely
to be welcomed, for reasons that this author and others
have elaborated in many earlier articles. The old 'lean
versus clean' debate is resolved once again now in favor
of leaning - this time not only in the realm of monetary
policy, but in that of its cousin finance-regulatory policy
as well. The victory does, however, raise certain new
legal challenges to which predominantly microprudential
finance-regulatory regimes are not typically subject -
challenges of which legal scholars, regulators,
policymakers and other financially-oriented lawyers will
wish to remain mindful.
This Article aims to assist that endeavor by
exhaustively anticipating, cataloguing, and provisionally
addressing all of the mentioned challenges, in order that
interested parties might thereby be able to find
comprehensive treatment of the subject in one place. The
hope is that this will ultimately make for both better theory
and better practice where finance and its regulation are
concerned.
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INTRODUCTION
INCE the mid-1990s, and particularly since the global financial dramas of
2008-09, authorities on financial regulation have come increasingly to
counsel the inclusion of macroprudential policy instruments in the standard
'toolkit' of finance-regulatory measures employed by financial regulators.
The hallmark of this perspective is its focus not simply on the safety and
soundness of individual financial institutions, as is characteristic of the
traditional 'microprudential' perspective, but also on certain structural
features of financial systems that can imperil such systems as wholes.
Systemic 'financial stability' thus comes to supplement, though not to
supplant, institutional 'safety and soundness' as a regulatory desideratum.
Indeed it comes to be recognized as prerequisite to the same.
Evidence of this shift from a once primarily microprudential to a now
macroprudential-inclusive focus can be found not only in many scholarly and
policy papers - including a great deal of work produced by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 'Fund), and sundry central banks
worldwide over the past decade and a half - but also in many new treaty-
based, statutory, and administrative provisions agreed or enacted in multiple
jurisdictions worldwide over the past several years.1 In fact, one recent Fund
1 See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements, Models and Tools for Marn'opridenta/ Analszs
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Paper No. 21), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs-wp2l.pdf; Financial Stability Board, Overview of
Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening
Financial Stability avai/ab/e at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 120619a.pdf; International
Monetary Fund, PolicesforMacrofinancialSabiliy (Staff Discussion Note 12/06), available at
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1206.pdf; European Central Bank, Monetary
and Macroprudential Po/ities (European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 1449),
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwpl449.pdf; BANK OF
The Macroprudential Turn
paper reports that some 50 jurisdictions, including all of the world's most
developed economies, have formally adopted macroprudential finance-
regulatory measures since early 2009.2
The move from primarily micro- to combined micro- and
macroprudential finance-regulatory regimes is surely to be welcomed, for
reasons both that this author has adduced in earlier articles and that will be
briefly rehearsed below It also, however, raises a number of new legal
challenges to which predominantly microprudential finance-regulatory
regimes are not typically subject - challenges of which regulators and other
lawyers will wish to remain mindful. This Article aims to assist that endeavor
by exhaustively cataloguing and provisionally addressing the mentioned
challenges, in order that all interested parties might thereby be able to find
comprehensive treatment of the subject in one place.
The structure of the Article is as follows. Part II briefly rehearses what
distinguishes the macroprudential finance-regulatory perspective from the
more traditional microprudential approach to financial regulation, briefly
explaining in passing why the shift has occurred. The aim is thereby to render
the specifically legal discussion in subsequent parts of the Article more
readily appreciable. Part III then elaborates the principal legal issues and
tradeoffs that are implicated by this change of perspective from mere micro-
to combined micro- and macroprudential regulation, while also delineating
and provisionally assessing the options that look to be available for addressing
them.
ENGLAND, DISCUSSION PAPER Instruments of Macroprudential Poliy (December 2011),
available at
http: / /www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications /Documents /other/financialstability /disc
ussionpaperll1220.pdf. This is a very small sampling. A simple web search on such
terms as 'macroprudential,' 'financial stability,' or 'systemic risk' will immediately turn up
web-available working papers from nearly all of the world's central banks, finance
ministries, financially oriented IGOs and NGOs. As for legal provisions, see International
Monetary Fund, infra, note 2.
2 See International Monetary Fund, Macroprudential Policy: Wbat Instruments and How to Use
Them? Lessons from Countr Experiences (IMF Working Paper 11/238), available at
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/201 1/wpl 1238.pdf.
3 Among the mentioned previous articles are: e.g., Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upperfor Fiance,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010); Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52
CHALLENGE 36 (2009); Robert Hockett, BubbleI Bust and Blame, 37 CORNELL LAW
FORUM 14 (2011); Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, 3 J. FIN.
PERSPECTIVES (2015) (forthcoming). The principal message of all three is that even
individually rational and legally permissible decisions can aggregate into collectively
irrational outcomes, meaning in turn that microprudential regulation cannot of itself
address systemic risk.
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Part IV provides a representative sampling of macroprudential finance-
regulatory regimes now either in place or in the process of enactment in a
number of representative jurisdictions. In so doing it highlights how these
regimes address and resolve the particular issues and tradeoff questions
elaborated in Part III. The aim is to afford some measure of concrete
appreciation of the options available to jurisdictions that seek to supplement
their microprudentially oriented finance-regulatory regimes with
macroprudential policy instruments.
Part V then concludes and looks forward, highlighting in particular
certain still unresolved finance-theoretic issues whose resolution will likely
invite revisitation of issues provisionally resolved in this Article.
I. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION - WHAT, WHY, How AND WHO
Full appreciation of the legal issues and tradeoffs implicated by
macroprudential finance-regulatory policy will be facilitated by a brief review
of what is distinctive about the macroprudential perspective - that is to say,
of what specific changes this perspective brings to the formulation and
conduct of financial regulation. The latter in turn can be quickly conveyed by
(a) contrasting the macroprudential with the once-dominant microprudential
perspective that it has come to supplement, (b) noting why such
supplementation has been found necessary, (c) cataloguing the tools with
which macroprudential regulation is now typically effected, and (d) specifying
who the macroprudential regulators deploying those tools tend to be or are
likely in future to be.
A. What: Distinction from Microprudential Regulation
1. Sjystemic Rather Than Individual Firm Focus
The shift from primarily microprudential to combined micro- and
macroprudential finance-regulatory policy is, before anything else, a shift of
attention or focus. Specifically, it is a shift from exclusive attention to the
safety and soundness of individual financial institutions to a focus upon the
health and stability of the financial system as a whole.4 The ultimate aim is to
safeguard the financial system's capacity to allocate resources and risks
efficiently throughout the 'real' economy over time. This of course does not
mean that individual firms and their practices are no longer monitored - they
4 See supra, note 3, on why such a shift might be warranted.
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are, after all, critical components of the financial system. It simply means
that in addition to firms and their practices, structural features of the financial
system in which these firms jointly participate - including market and other
transactional infrastructures, interactions between and among persons and
firms, and systemic proneness to volatility-heightening self-amplification or
'feedback' mechanisms - also become objects of regulatory attention.
Were a financial system none but the sum of its parts, there would be no
need to distinguish between micro- and macroprudentialfoci. Microprudential
supervision of all parts of the system would sum up to supervision of the
system itself. A financial system, however, is more than the sum of its parts.
It also embraces relations among parts, as mediated through transactional
infrastructures and various species of financial claim that institutions and
individuals issue to one another. On some occasions, moreover, these market
infrastructures and claim-types support transactions among actors that bear
certain price-volatility-heightening 'feedback' characteristics - the makings of
'bubbles' and 'busts.'5 We can group all of these additional elements of the
financial system together as 'structural' features of that system, and
characterize the macroprudential perspective as that which attends to these
structural features of the system while microprudential regulation attends
more narrowly to the institutions that participate in the system.
What 'structure' of this sort adds to the sum of the parts of a financial
system can be neatly - and for subsequent purposes suggestively - drawn out
by reference to a particular vulnerability alluded to just above, to which
financial systems historically appear to be particularly prone. The
vulnerability in question is a recursive rendition of what social scientists will
recognize as the classic 'collective action problem.'6 A collective action
problem afflicts a group of actors whenever they find themselves in a
situation in which multiple individually rational decisions can aggregate into a
collectively self-defeating - even calamitous - outcome. Arms races, 'bums'
rushes,' and commons tragedies are familiar examples. More to the present
purpose, so are price inflations, deflations, bubbles and busts.'
5 This is the principal point made by Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 3.
See also other sources there cited.
6 See Hockett, Recursive Collectve Acon Problems, supra note 3; see also Robert Hockett, Bret/on
Woods 1.0: A Constructve Retrieval for Sustainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
401 (2013), Part ii of which interprets the original Keynesian vision for what became the
IMF as that of a global agent charged with the task of addressing recursive collective
action problems afflicting the global macroeconomy.
7 See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 3 at Parts 2 and 5.
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Probably the most familiar instance of a finance-related recursive
collective action problem in the minds of laypersons is the 'bank run.'8 The
sense in which a bank run is a collective action problem is this: Given
fractional reserve banking and a plausible rumor of looming insolvency, it can
be rational for each depositor in a given bank, absent deposit insurance, to
seek to be first in the queue of anticipated withdrawers of funds.9 To hold
off, after all, is simply to risk losing everything, since no one abstainer can
stop the run by refusing to participate any more than she could single-
handedly stop a consumer price inflation by refraining from purchasing. Yet
every depositor's acting thus rationally can itself bring about the very event
that is feared - even when the information that sets off the run proves in the end to have
been groundless. Mere fears of a solvency crisis can in this sense prove self-
fulfilling, morphing into a liquidity crisis that morphs into a bona fide
solvency crisis that harms virtually everyone notwithstanding the prudence of
their individual decisions to withdraw.10
It is structural vulnerabilities of this sort - vulnerabilities rooted, in the
bank run example, both in the transactional relations among banks and
depositors and in the legal characteristics of demand deposit claims - that the
institutional focus of traditional microprudential regulation tends especially to
miss. For to monitor the practices of individual financial institutions alone
for their safety and soundness, with no attention paid the harms that can be
wrought by interacting decisions or practices in aggregate even when
individually prudent or rational, is akin to exclusively monitoring the decisions
of individual bank depositors for their rationality during a run. The prudence
or rationality of the individual decisions in such situations is itself part of the
problem - it is the mechanism through which the problem is propagated.
8 Bank runs are a common feature of extreme banking crises. During a bank run, rumors
that a bank is insolvent (liabilities exceed assets) prompt depositors to rush to withdraw
their deposits, because they expect the bank to fail. In fact, this sudden withdrawal of
deposits can cause a perfectly solvent bank to fail, because it lacks the cash on hand (but
not the assets) to meet this demand. See Douglas W Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank
Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity, 91 J. PoL. ECON. 401 (1983); Hockett, Recursive Collective
Action Problems, supra note 3.
9 Fractional reserve banking is the system of banking in which a bank retains only a portion
of their assets as liquid assets. It turns the rest of its assets into illiquid assets in the form
of long-term loans with set repayment schedules. All depositors likely know that their
bank will not have sufficient liquid assets on hand to allow all depositors to withdraw their
deposits at once. However, if depositors believe-even erroneously-that the bank is
insolvent, it is rational for each individual to withdraw his or her own funds, seeking to be
early in the line for insufficient assets. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra
note 3, at 12-13.
10 See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 3.
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Hence fully addressing the problem requires more than ensuring that
individual actors act rationally 1
2. Particular Attention Paid Cross-Institutional and -Sectoral Linkages,
Market Infrastructures, and Inter-Substitutabi/ities
The macroprudential perspective accordingly supplements
microprudential supervision of individual institutions by attending specifically
to cross-institutional and cross-sectoral linkages and interactions across the
financial system. It attends, that is, to the specific relations among parts of
the system - including transactions between counterparties, the 'platforms' or
infrastructures on which they transact, and the specific legal rights and
obligations associated with particular financial instruments - in order to
better monitor the health and stability of the financial system as a whole. It
also attends, by way of corollary, to functional convergences among what
were once more radically distinct kinds of financial institution and
instrument, in order that expertise developed in the regulation of one kind of
institution or transaction - for example, a bank deposit - can be more readily
brought to bear in regulating other kinds of institution or transaction - for
example, money market fund investments - when they come to resemble the
first kind. 12
In doing these things, it should be noted, macroprudential regulation
better safeguards individuals and institutions themselves, entities whose
financial health rides on the longterm health of the system. This is the sense
in which macroprudential regulation supplements, rather than supplants,
more traditional microprudential regulation - and is indeed a prerequisite to
effective such regulation. It is also helpful to note that there are at least three
related yet subtly distinct reasons for regulators to attend to linkages and
convergences among, and forms of financial claim transacted between,
parties throughout the financial system in the interest of maintaining the
stable functionality of that system. Two of these reasons are familiar, the
other perhaps less so.
The familiar reasons for systemic focus have received lip service since at
least ten years prior to the calamities of 2008.13 One is balance-sheet-
11 This is, again, a 'key takeaway' from Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems supra note 3.
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to 'Mission-Creep", 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 153 (2002) (arguing that IMF interest in member countries' domestic corporate
governance and securities -regulatory regimes is justified by reference to those variables'
effects upon the global financial system).
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mediated 'financial contagion' of the sort that has gone often remarked since
the 'Asian Financial Crisis' of the late 1990s. 14  The other is 'functional
convergence' of the sort noted a moment ago, which has been observed to be
underway among once very distinct kinds of financial institutions since the
1980s. 15
'Contagion' of the mentioned sort refers to the perils faced by one or
more institutions in virtue of their dependencies on the specific
performances of other institutions.16 Where institution A owes institution B
on a financial contract, for example, institution A's insolvency can increase the
likelihood of B's insolvency. If B in turn owes C, As failure can ultimately
harm C as well. And so on. A balance-sheet-mediated 'chain reaction' can
occur, pursuant to which multiple institutions - and hence individuals as well
- are brought to the brink of insolvency by the failure of but one individual
or firm.
'Convergence' of the mentioned variety refers to the ways in which many
once-distinct kinds of financial institution increasingly have come to offer
inter-substitutable products and services - a process that has been much
facilitated by the development of derivative instruments and other forms of
financial innovation.1  Money market mutual fund (MMMF) investments, for
example, have in recent decades come to function more and more like
traditional bank demand deposit accounts, such that MMMFs have become
partial bank substitutes.18 Life insurance policies, for their part, have steadily
taken on attributes not unlike those of traditional savings deposit accounts,
14 See id. at Introduction and Part iii.
15 See, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 5-
21 (West, 2015) (forthcoming).
16 See, e.g., Hockett, From Macro to Micro to 'Mission-Creep " supra note 15.
17 "Shadow banks are financial companies not subject to prudential supervision and
regulation that use short-term or near-demandable debt to fund longer-term assets. In
other words, shadow banks essentially perform the same critical, core functions as
traditional banks, but without an explicit safety net or prudential regulation. As a result,
the shadow banking system is susceptible to disruptions that threaten financial and
economic stability and lead to additional implicit government guarantees and the
associated incentive to take excessive risks." Thomas M. Hoenig & Charles S. Morris,
Restructuring the Banking System to Improve Safety and Soundness 2-3, (May 24, 2011,
Revised December 2012), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/Restructuring-the-Banking-System-05-24-
11.pdf.
18 Id. at 7 (noting that "... banks had to compete with money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) ... that paid interest on close substitutes for bank demand deposits"). See also,
id. at 8 (explaining how "MMMF investors act more like depositors and will run whenever
they are concerned about a fund's safety.").
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while hedging instruments purchasable on derivatives markets of course bear
the characteristics of insurance policies.19 And so on.
In theory, the dangers posed by cross-institutional linkages and inter-
substitutabilities of these sorts can be addressed simply by more
thoroughgoing microprudential regulation. Such is the principal point behind
lending limits and cognate portfolio-diversification requirements in the
microprudential regulation of depository institutions and insurance
companies, for example, as well as behind rules requiring that MNMFs
maintain share prices of one currency unit per share.20 It also is one of the
multiple reasons behind capital requirements imposed upon most nominally
distinct kinds of financial institution - banks, broker-dealers, and insurance
companies alike.21
On the other hand, the proliferation and 'complexification' of
interdependencies and inter-substitutabilities of these sorts among multiple
financial institutions in recent decades - much of it, too, facilitated by
complex derivative financial instruments and other forms of financial
innovation - undoubtedly has brought about a state of affairs in which
oversight of the financial system as a whole, with all of its market
infrastructures and cross-institutional linkages and convergences, can at least
enhance the knowledge base from which traditional microprudential
regulation operates.22 That is part of the point behind 'stress -testing' of large
19 For instance, insurance companies market "cash value life insurance," which is more
costly than term life insurance, but offers customers the opportunity to build equity in
their policy, as they might build equity in their house as they pay down a mortgage. See,
e.g., About Life Insurance, MET LIFE, available at
https://wwwmetlife.com/individual/insurance/life-insurance/index.html; Cash Value Life
Insurance: Protection and Built-In Tax Breaks, UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION,
available at https://www.usaa.com/inet/pages/advice-cash-value life insurance.
20 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.817-5 (2013); Risk Mangement Manual of Examination Poliies f 3.2 Loans,
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-2.html (showing portfolio
diversification in depository institutions); Money Market Fund Reform Options, REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 1-2, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/10.21%/020PWG%/o20Report%/o20Final.pdf. But see id. at 13-16(explaining that the new S.E.C. Rules now require MMMFs to maintain a floating NAV).
21 "The incentive to take excessive risk traditionally has been contained through strong on-
site examinations and minimum capital requirements that were supplemented as
appropriate based on the exam results." Hoenig & Morris, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis
omitted).
22 See Hockett, A Fixer-Upperfor Finance, supra note 3 at 1282.
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interconnected financial institutions of all sorts, such as has become popular
in regulatory circles since the crisis of 2008-09.23
These 'interconnectedness' and 'inter-substitutability' rationales for a
macroprudential supplementation of traditional microprudential regulatory
policy are especially strong when transactional linkages and convergences are
not only cross-institutional, but also cross-sectoral in character - particularly
in jurisdictions like the U.S., where evermore frequently cross-sectorally
transacting and mimicking depository institutions, broker-dealers, and
insurance companies continue to be regulated by distinct regulators operating
under distinct mandates. Under such circumstances, each distinct sectoral
regulator can benefit significantly by the expertise of the other sectoral
regulators. The establishment of fora that facilitate information-exchange
and other forms of collaboration among such regulators - such as the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) instituted by the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Act in the U.S. - can accordingly be viewed as macroprudentially
oriented supplementations of the traditional microprudential finance-
regulatory regime.24
Much the same can be said of the designation of particularly large
financial firms and conglomerates, with particularly far flung and intricate
webs of transactional relations throughout the financial system, as
'systemically important financial institutions' ('SIFIs') upon which augmented
microprudential regulatory requirements such as capital surcharges are
levied.25 Similarly, consider the heightened attention paid market utilities and
trading infrastructures, many of them not high speed electronic, under
macroprudential regulatory regimes. 26 In all of these cases, forms and means
of interlinkage or inter-substitutability among institutions, and the cross-
institutional liabilities facilitated thereby, become objects of regulatory
attention in hopes of ensuring longterm financial stability and thereby
maintaining the safety and soundness of the individual institutions and
persons that participate in the financial system.
23 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 5 165 (i), 12 U.S.C. 5 5365.
24 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)). For
more on the FSOC, see id. Titles I and II. See also infra, Part IV.
25 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)), Titles I
and ii.
26 Id. at Title VIII.
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3. Particular Attention Paid 'Feedback'Mechanisms and Procyclicaliy
While cross-sectoral convergence and the traditional market
infrastructure and balance sheet mechanisms by which cross-institutional and
trans-sectoral linkages can propagate financial contagion are both familiar and
addressable in principle, if not always efficiently in practice, by traditional
microprudential regulatory means, the other such mechanism is less so. This
is the mechanism pursuant to which actions by one institution affect other
institutions not by suddenly depriving them of specific performance on the
part of assets they thought that they had, but via their effects upon assetprices
market-wide. This mechanism bears certain recursive - or 'feedback loop' -
properties that traditional microprudential oversight misses not only in
practice, but even in principle.21 Of particular concern here are stability-
imperiling self-amplification processes of the 'bank run' variety that often
characterize the mutually influencing actions of distinct financial actors. 28
The counterpart to a bank run in a market for some financial asset such
as mortgage backed securities (MBS), for example, is a 'run' from the asset
itself. Such runs are mediated by rational responses on the part of some
actors to the actions of other actors - just as the bank depositor joins the
queue of withdrawers upon noticing that this queue is already forming.29 An
institution that holds a large portfolio of MBS, for example, will see the value
of its portfolio rapidly dropping should other large holders of MBS suddenly
begin selling their holdings - quite irrespective of what this institution itself is
doing. Confronted by that threat, the institution might prudently determine
to sell its own holdings, even at a significant loss, simply to avoid greater loss
should the run continue. Other MBS holders might follow this institution in
turn, thereby pushing down prices yet further. This might induce earlier
sellers into selling yet more... and so on, with widespread insolvency system-
wide as the ultimate result.30
The same mechanism can operate 'in reverse,' of course, in which case
the 'run' is not from, but to the asset in question. Such is precisely what
happens under 'bubble' or 'mania' conditions, of course, where the mania in
question characterizes the markets as wholes rather than individual
27 See Hockett, Recursive Collective Acion Problems, supra note 3; see also Hockett, Bretton Woods
1.0: A Constructive Rerieval for Sustainable Finance, 16 N.YU. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401
(2013).
28 See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 3.
29 See Hockett, sources cited supra, note 3.
30 See Hockett, sources cited supra, note 3, for more examples of this form of 'downward
spiral.'
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participants in those markets. It can, after all, be altogether individually
rational to borrow at cheap rates to purchase assets whose prices are rising at
rapid rates, so as to profit on the widening spread - indeed, some financial
advisers are arguably fiduciarily obligated to do this for clients. Hence a
regulatory perspective from which institutional practices are evaluated only
for their short-term financial soundness is a perspective from which bubbles,
which massively misallocate resources and risks and tend all too often to end
in calamitous busts and protracted debt deflations, is a perspective from
which financial regulators will be unable even in principle to do what the 'real'
economy needs most.31
'Spirals' or 'feedback loops' of this mentioned variety, downward and
upward alike, are of course hardy perennials of financial history.32 Indeed
they have often occurred with sufficient frequency as to be viewed by many as
constituting, at least retrospectively, more or less tractable 'cycles.' 33 A - if
not the - key policy objective of macroprudential supervision is accordingly
to counteract, where possible, these potentially catastrophic self-amplification
mechanisms and thereby act 'countercyclically.' 34 The point in so doing is to
diminish the amplitudes of each cycle's peaks and troughs, thereby
modulating the 'swings,' diminishing volatility, and thus assuring a better
allocation of resource and risk through the 'real' economy over time. Such is
the very meaning of 'financial stability' on most understandings. 35
This countercyclical form of supervisory action, it bears emphasis,
cannot be effected by traditional microprudential regulatory means alone -
either in practice or even in principle. Neither the traditional tools nor,
especially, the traditional focus are up to the task; for they seek and address a
categorically distinct kind of vulnerability. In this sense, attention to recursive
self-amplification processes, along with countercyclical policy tools aimed at
modulating such processes, are in a sense what is most distinctive about
macroprudential financial supervision and regulation. They are the principal
value that this perspective adds to financial regulation.
31 See again Hockett, sources cited supra, note 3, for more examples of this form of
'downward spiral.'
32 See again Hockett, sources cited supra, note 3. See also ROBERT ALIBER AND CHARLES
KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th
ed. 2005) (examining, throughout, a vast sample of financial crises in centuries past).
33 See again ALIBER AND KINDLEBERGER, id.
34 Such is the argument made throughout Hockett, sources cited supra, note 3.
35 See, e.g., sources cited supra, note 1.
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B. Why: Reasons for Widening the Regulatory Lens
The principal reasons for supplementing the microprudential with a
macroprudential finance-regulatory perspective are implicit in the preliminary
characterization of the latter perspective above. It will help nonetheless both
to render these reasons explicit and to note several additional reasons now
prompting the move to a macroprudential perspective on financial
supervision worldwide.
1. Cross-Sectoral Functional Convergence and RegulatolorArbitrage, Including 'Shadow
Banking,' Challenge Fragmented Regulators
One reason for supplementing microprudential with macroprudential
financial regulation stems from the cross-sectoral functional convergence in
the financial services industry noted above. Pursuant to this dynamic, once
very distinct kinds of financial institutions increasingly come to resemble each
other in the products and services they offer and the functions they perform.
Prior to the 1980s, for example, demand deposits held at commercial
banks and thrift organizations in the U.S. constituted nearly the sole means by
which individuals could both save in and spend from the same asset
accounts.36 Such deposits accordingly came to constitute the backbone of the
wider economy's payments system, meaning in turn that they took on some
attributes of public utilities.3 That in turn meant that they had to be viewed
as 'special' by regulators, since failures on the part of institutions that offered
them - depository institutions - would impose significant externalities even
on non-depositors who benefitted by the accelerated transacting activity that a
payments system facilitated. 'Special' for these purposes meant both federally
deposit-insured and especially carefully regulated."
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, however, American investment
companies increasingly came to offer MNMFs bearing many of the attributes
of bank deposits, with the added feature of offering higher returns - a
capacity rooted in MMVMFs' freedom to invest in higher risk, higher return
assets bank-regulatory regime permitted for depository institutions.3 9 The
consequence was that more and more Americans came to use MNMFs as
36 See ROBERT HOCKETT, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 17 at 5-21 (West 2013)
(forthcoming).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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bank accounts in which they invested and from which they made payments. 40
This meant in turn that widespread failures of MNMFs could impost social
costs much like those that widespread bank failure would have imposed in the
past. Yet MMFs were neither deposit-insured nor especially carefully
regulated as banks were. In effect, MNMFs had engaged in so-called
'regulatory arbitrage' - offering less regulated, very close substitutes for
heavily regulated ones, thereby peeling away customers from the more
regulated sector and reinstating risks to the financial system that the evaded
body of regulation had been instituted to eliminate.
Evolution of this sort is of course very common in the financial services
industry, meaning that an institutional or even sectoral focus on the part of
financial regulation will tend to miss an important source of risk over time.
The tendency was of course on dramatic display during the crisis of 2008-09,
when in the U.S. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was
forced to offer temporary deposit insurance to MMFs in order to stave off
an old fashioned 'bank run' on the same, while the Federal Reserve ('Fed') for
its part had to step in to act as discounter and market maker of last resort in
other markets that had come to function much like bank substitutes - notably
the triparty repo market.41
While the emergency measures taken by the Fed and FDIC in the U.S.,
and by counterpart authorities in other jurisdictions, were innovative,
expeditious, and impressively effective, one lesson of the crisis appears to be
that things would have been better had these measures been prevented from
having to become necessary in first place - by having bank-regulatory-like
provisions in place in advance so as to regulate these nonbank institutions
more as we regulate banks insofar as they performed classic bank functions.
But spotting such needs is much more likely when a macroprudential
approach to financial regulation, attentive to cross-sectoral changes and
functional convergences, supplements the more traditional microprudential
perspective.
40 Id.
41 For a comprehensive account of the full course of events and the relations among its
component parts, see GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND (2010).
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2. Worst Crises are Cross-Sectoral and Sstem-Wide
A related reason for supplementing traditional microprudential financial
regulation with a macroprudential component is that the worst episodes of
radical financial instability - that is, the most devastating financial crises - are
typically themselves cross-sectoral in character.42 This in turn stems both
from convergences of the sort noted above, and relatedly from cross-sectoral
transacting of the kind noted yet further above. Once again, salient features
of the recent 2008-09 crisis are illustrative.
Two of the higher profile institutional failures of 2008, for example, were
those of Lehman Brothers a broker-dealer firm - and American
International Group (MG) an insurance firm. 43  But these failures,
notwithstanding their afflicting distinct kinds of financial institution, were
anything but unrelated. The reason was that AIG had insured various claims
held by various financial institutions on Lehman Brothers, in the form of
credit default swap (CDS) instruments it had sold to the institutions in
question. 44 The upshot was that Lehman's failure triggered massive liability
on the part of AIG, which AIG then turned out not to be good for. That in
turn shook the solvency of yet further financial institutions that were relying,
via their CDS holdings, on the solvency of AIG.45
There was, then, in 2008, a massive balance-sheet-mediated cascade of
the sort noted above in Part II.A.2. Like remarks hold of previous high
profile systemic financial crises, in which financial contagion ignores sectoral
boundaries precisely because prior transactions' ignoring of those same
boundaries have played critical roles in enabling systemwide crisis via cross-
sectoral linkage in the first place.46 It would seem to follow that the worst
financial crises are much more apt to be detected in the brewing by regulators
who themselves look past sectoral boundaries - that is, who themselves
survey webs of transactional connection system-wide. And those are of
course simply regulators who think as macroprudentially as they do
microprudentially.
42 See Hockett, Fixer-Upper, supra, note 3 (arguing that the worst crises have been those that
pair stock market crashes with real estate crashes). See also Aliber and Kindleberger, supra
note 34, on Scandinavian and Japanese crises of the early 1990s, which paired both.
43 Andrew Ross Sorkin, et. al, Bids to HaI Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wa/i SI., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008; Edmund L. Andrews, et. al., Fed' $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008.
44 See supra note 45.
45 See supra note 45.
46 See supra note 29.
9:201 (2015)
Virginia Law & Business Review
3. Worst Crises are Se/f-Worsening via Feedback Mechanisms
just as it is unsurprising that the worst financial crises tend to be cross-
sectoral and system-wide in character, precisely because system-wide, cross-
sectoral transacting itself propagates the contagion, so is it unsurprising that
the worst financial crises also bear recursive collective action problem
characteristics of the sort described above?47 For these characteristics, too,
are of precisely the sort that render crises particularly calamitous. The reason
is that the presence of self-amplification mechanisms of this sort deprives
financial systems of natural resting points, or equilibria.
This is easy to see by reference to the 'run on assets' example considered
above in Part II.A.3. Where an institution holds a portfolio of some asset
that suddenly comes to be sold off in mass quantities on a market, it will see
the value of its own portfolio rapidly dropping. It will then find the prospect
of sale of its own holdings that much more prudent, and act accordingly.
Other institutions, acting rationally upon the same considerations, will be apt
to do likewise. This will induce further drops in the price of the asset, leading
to yet more decisions to dump the asset in question - including by institutions
that already have dumped some of their holdings.
In such cases there is no obvious endpoint save that at which the asset in
question is devoid of all or nearly all value - is indeed widely perceived to be
'toxic.' The end result is that all institutions in all sectors that have held
significant portfolios of the asset have experienced near total losses on the
asset. It is as if a single very large institution that has massively owed multiple
other institutions has defaulted in respect of all of them. The asset in this
sense acts as a sort of virus, infecting all that have held it. And of course if
there are multiple such assets, matters are so much the worse. Naturally, then,
crises involving the 'feedback' dynamic tend to be most destructive. 48
The recent crisis of 2008-09 is of course illustrative here just as it was in
the previous subsection. In this case, multiple instrument types played the
'viral' role. The first wave of runs concerned perceivedly toxic MBS. The
next wave concerned CDS and other derivative instruments whose values
were tied to the values, first, of MBS, and second of firms that issued them as
had AIG. Yet further waves then involved other claims on institutions whose
fortunes waxed or waned with the values of MBS or CDS or issuers of the
same themselves. 49 Once again, then, a regulatory regime that would avoid
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
9:201 (2015)
The Macroprudential Turn
crises of this magnitude is one that will be on the lookout for feedback
mechanisms of the described kind as fully as - if not indeed more fully than
- it is on the lookout for cross-sectoral transactional linkages as described just
above.
C. How: The Emerging Macroprudential 'Tool Kit'
The set of measures that financial regulators have been assembling for
purposes of macroprudential regulation has come to be known in regulatory
circles as 'the toolkit.'50 The toolkit so-called is in a certain sense incomplete,
in that it does not include changes to the agency structure discussed in the
next subpart - ID, on 'Who.' Supplemented by the latter, however, the 'kit'
is surprisingly resourceful. It also bears noting that, while the administrative
reorganizational measures described in the next subpart appear to be directed
toward the cross-institutional and -sectoral linkage and convergence rationales
for macroprudential regulation discussed above in Parts II.A.2 and I.B..1, the
'tools' in the 'kit' described here all are aimed at the recursive collective action
problem rationale discussed above in Parts II.A.3 and II.B.3.
1. Cross-Sec/oral Leverage Ceilings - LTV, DTI, and Margin Requirements
The first two tools in the kit aim to close spreads between borrowing
costs (broadly construed to include collateral requirements and interest
charges) and capital gains appreciation rates of the sort noted above to make
participation in asset price bubbles financially rational for individuals. The
idea is to make it more difficult to borrow to buy for speculative purposes, a
practice which, as the lead up to 2008-09 brought home yet again, lies at the
very heart of the credit-fueled asset price bubble dynamic. One way to do
this is to limit the amount of leverage that a borrowing buyer can take on, by
insisting that more in the way of collateral and/or down payment or margin
be supplied by borrowers in lending transactions. Maximum loan-to-value
50 See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap, Richard Berner, Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Marroprudential
Toolkil (Dec. 2010 draft),
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/research/papers/MacroprudentialToolkitD
eclC.pdf; Maroprudential policy tools an d frameworks: Update to G20 Fiance MiVisers and
Central Bank Governors (Feb. 14, 2011), avai/able at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/021411.pdf; Governor Daniel K. Tarullo,
Speech at the Yale Law School Conference on Challenges in Global Financial Services,
(Sept. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20130920a.htm.
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(LTV) or debt-service-to-income (DTI) ratios are a straightforward means of
doing this, as are margin requirements in securities transactions.
Low - in some cases, even negative - down payment requirements
imposed upon home-buyers in the U.S. during the housing bubble, for
example, appear to have played a particularly significant role in fueling the
U.S. housing price bubble. Partly for this reason, the Dodd-Frank legislation
imposes more stringent LTV requirements upon would-be home buyers in
the U.S. Other jurisdictions, as discussed below in Part IV, have taken similar
measures, while imposing maximal DTI requirements as well. It is easy to
appreciate why, as the U.S. was far from the only jurisdiction to suffer a credit-
fueled housing price bubble in recent years. Finally, many jurisdictions are
imposing counterpart requirements in the realm of securities transactions, in
the form of tighter margin requirements.
As the reference to securities transactions in addition to real estate
transactions suggests, leverage ceilings used as a macroprudential policy tool
are apt to be most effective when applied cross-sectorally, system-wide.
There are at least two related reasons, both of which are rooted in
observations made above in Parts II.A and II.B.
One reason is that, as noted above, cross-sectoral linkages have become
much more dense in recent decades relative to before, such that institutions in
one sector in which leverage is well regulated might nevertheless end up more
vulnerable than they once were to failures on the part other institutions in
other sectors where leverage is less well regulated. The other reason is that
the earlier mentioned functional convergence and product inter-
substitutability developments of recent decades make it much easier than it
once was to evade regulations in one sector by taking functionally equivalent
actions in another sector.51
For these reasons this tool, like those elaborated below, is couched in
'cross-sectoral' terms. For other reasons to be cited below, this tool can also
be 'dynamically' - in particular, countercyclically - applied, as can be most of
the other tools in the 'kit.' In such cases one simply calibrates the
requirements in question so as to render them more onerous as a 'boom'
phase of the cycle is approached, while rendering them less onerous as
conditions approach those of a 'bust.'
51 See supra note 19.
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2. Cross-Sectoral Credit and Credit-Growth Ceilings
Another way to narrow the spread between low borrowing costs - again
broadly construed - and high capital gains appreciation rates, of course, is to
place more direct limits on permissible credit-extension or credit growth rates
themselves. Capital buffer and reserve requirements, discussed just below, are
of course means of doing this, but one can also simply impose upper bounds
on lending - both to particular borrowers and in aggregate - independently
of capital or reserve conditions. As recent empirical survey literature points
out, most jurisdictions that limit leverage along the lines described
immediately above also impose limits on credit or credit-growth, having
found that use of both tools in tandem strengthens the effectiveness of
each.5 2
It should also be noted that the same reasons given immediately above
for couching leverage regulation in cross-sectoral terms also militate in favor
of couching credit-growth regulation in cross-sectoral terms. The same holds
of dynamic - in particular, countercyclical - application of such
requirements. The idea would again be progressively to discourage credit-
extension as the financial cycle entered into a 'boom' phase, while doing the
contrary as conditions entered 'bust' territory.
3. Cross-Sectoral Reserve and Capital Buffer Requirements
Two of the more venerable policy levers well suited to trimming the
spread between borrowing costs and capital gains are reserve and capital
requirements. Both are typically explained and justified as 'buffers' that
individual firms are required to maintain in order to prevent liquidity shocks
of the sort that can morph into solvency crises in the event of counterparty
failure. In that sense they are microprudential tools. Yet these same tools, as
applied to multiple institutions, also work much as do systemwide
macroprudential leverage and credit ceilings.
52 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE INTERACTION OF MONETARY AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES, 15 (2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012913.pdf; INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, BRAZIL: TECHNICAL NOTE ON MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
FRAMEWORK, 17 (2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13148.pdf; Luiz Awazu Pereira da
Silva and Ricardo Eyer Harris, Through the GlobalFinance Storm: Brazils Recent Experience wib
Monetaj7 and Maroprdential Policies to Lean Against the Financial Ccle and Deal witb Systemic
Risk, (Banco Central do Brasil, Working Paper No. 290, 2012), available at
http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps290.pdf.
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How? In essence, a regulator simply requires that financial institutions
hold larger portions of their investable funds in the form of money, in the
case of required reserves, or a mix of investor-supplied money, tier 1 capital
(principally shareholder equity), and tier 2 capital (largely subordinated debt)
in the case of required capital buffers. The requirements naturally limit the
amount of credit extension in which institutions are able to engage. Funds
that would otherwise flow outward in the form of additional lending are
instead either retained internally, in the form of money reserves, or naturally
limited by how much in the way of unsecured at-risk capital can be raised
from equity and subordinated debt holders, in the cases of tier 1 and tier 2
capital.53
It should also be noted that reserve requirements and required capital
buffers can be employed countercyclically, simply by boosting required
amounts during 'boom' phases of the cycle and relaxing them during 'bust'
phases. The People's Bank of China, for example, adjusted reserve
requirements with great frequency in 2010 and 2011 in order - successfully, as
it turned out - to tamp down emerging price inflation in the real estate
sector.5 4 And the Basel Committee, followed by the G20, agreed in the same
period upon inclusion of a recommended countercyclical buffer in the latest,
Basel 3, capital accords.55
A final point worth making in this connection, to be further elaborated
below, is that reserve and capital requirements can work in tandem with,
hence can be supplemented - or even replaced - by, reserve and deposit
insurance systems for depository institutions. Indeed the central reserves and
insurance pools, respectively, maintained by such programs are functionally
53 The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation
of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. It has
created tiers of capital and set capital requirements for banks. See About the Basel
Commiee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, June 10, 2013), available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm. The United States has implemented Basel ii, and is
in the process of implementing Basel ii, both of which address tier 1 and tier 2 capital
requirements. See Basel Regulatoy Capital Framework, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (July 2, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/BaselCommitteeDocuments.htm.
54 See Cbina raises bank reserve requirements ratio to curb lending and inflation, XINHUA NEWS, (Feb.
18, 2011), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2011-
02/18/c 13738814.htm.
55 See Guidance for national aulborities operating the countercfclical capital buffer, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs187.htm
(noting that Basel III has been endorsed by the G20 leaders); Basel Commitee on Banking
Supervision reforms - Basel III, Bank for International Settlements,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf.
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equivalent to systemically maintained buffers, which not only serve to protect
individual institutions (in the case of reserves) and depositors (in the case of
deposit insurance), but also can be countercyclically adjusted to alter the
quantum of available credit in the financial system. There will be a bit more
to say on this below in connection with dynamic provisioning.
4. Cross-Sectoral Liquidiy Minima and Maturiy Mismatch Maxima
One function of reserve requirements and capital buffers as described
just above is to prevent liquidity crises that can morph into solvency crises.
That danger is in turn rooted in the maturity transformation function
discharged by many financial institutions. In essence, such institutions
'borrow short' and 'lend long' in order to profit on the spread between the
low rates they need pay for short term borrowing and the higher rates they
can charge for longer term investing. In so doing they often perform a
valuable function in the real economy by pooling more funds than would be
available absent withdrawal-on-demand accounts in which investors with
liquidity and other flexibility needs can invest, and then channeling funds
from those larger pools to issuers who require longer term uses of funds in
order to bring projects to fruition.56
So long as the term structure of the asset pool comprising these issuers'
obligations is well managed and new short term funds are forthcoming at a
rate more or less matching the rate of demand withdrawals, this maturity
transformation function played by many financial institutions is a salutary
one. It channels more capital into productive activity in the 'real' economy.
The problem, however, is that sometimes certain adverse shocks or other
sudden blows to investor confidence - such as an unanticipated volume of
delinquencies or defaults on the asset side of the financial institution's balance
sheet - can induce, justifiably or otherwise, excess withdrawal activity or
inadequate rollover willingness on the part the shorter term investors.5
This is essentially what a 'run' of the sort noted above in Parts II.A and
II.B amounts to. And such runs, again as noted before, are the sort of fare
pursuant to which liquidity crises can morph into full-blown solvency crises.
The latter in turn often can grow, via interlinkage, psychological, and
'feedback'-induced contagion, from individual institution-affecting to full-
blown systemic liquidity and solvency crises - as happened in much of the
world during the autumn of 2008.
56 See Hockett, supra note 11.
57 Id.
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For these reasons another familiar microprudential policy lever that is
increasingly used as a macroprudential lever as well is the imposition of
certain liquidity minima and maturity mismatch maxima upon particular
financial institutions - particularly depository institutions.58 The idea here is
to limit the vulnerability just highlighted from either or both of 'both ends,' as
it were. The regulator requires either (a) that some portion of the institution's
assets be kept in either liquid (e.g., money) or readily liquidated (e.g., Treasury
securities) form, (b) that the degree of maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities be kept sufficiently low as not to occasion liquidity needs, or (c)
some combination of both - e.g., in the form of calibrating required liquidity
to maturity mismatch. Imposing such requirements system-wide can do
much to prevent otherwise containable shocks to individual institutions from
morphing, via the aforementioned feedback effects, into full-on solvency
crises faced by the institution - or, via the earlier mentioned contagion
channels, by the financial system more generally.59
Several additional observations bear noting in the present connection.
One is that this form of regulation is clearly complementary to reserve and
capital buffer requirements as these have just been described. Indeed the
justifications given are nearly identical. Second is that this form of regulation,
like all of those discussed up to now, amounts to a microprudential lever that
is readily employed as a macroprudential one.
Thirdly worth noting is that, also like the aforementioned policy levers,
this one too is apt to work best when employed across sectors throughout the
financial system. The reason is that maturity-mismatch-rooted liquidity crises
of the kind just elaborated are anything but limited to depository institutions
alone. One of the key lessons of the crisis of 2008-09, for example, is that
such commercial-bank-substitutes as the MNMF, derivative, and triparty repo
markets - as well as, through them, even the investment banking and
insurance industries - are just as subject to system-threatening 'runs' on the
part of short-term investors as were commercial banks and thrift institutions
58 In November 2012, G20 leaders called on various international institutions to do further
work on macroprudential policy frameworks. The Financial Stability Board, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Bank for International Settlements have provided
two updates, one in February 2011 and one in October 2011. Both updates have
addressed liquidity or maturity mismatch issues. See Macroprudential policy tools and
frameworks: Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, (Feb. 14, 2011) http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf;
Macroprudential Policy Tools and. Frameworks: Progress Report to G20, FINANCIAL STABILITY
BOARD, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/othpl 7.pdf.
59 Id.
9:201 (2015)
The Macroprudential Turn
before the advent of deposit insurance.60 Hence an effective macroprudential
regulatory regime that would make use of liquidity minima and maturity
mismatch maxima, just like any that employs leverage and credit ceilings or
reserve and capital requirements, will do best to apply the tool cross-
sectorally.
Finally, worth noting is that this lever too, again like those noted before it,
can be applied dynamically and indeed countercyclically. As boom phases of
the cycle begin to emerge, for example, the temptation to borrow yet shorter
in order to invest yet longer grows ever stronger, in order to stave off the
time at which highly demanded credit's price rises to close the spread between
itself and prevailing capital gains appreciation rates. Intervening in maturity
transformation economy-wide early on in the emergence of a boom can
accordingly serve to preempt the same's entry into full-on bubble territory.
5. Cross-Sectoral Dynamic and Countergyc/ical Provisioning
As suggested in connection with each of the tools elaborated just above,
each one is on the one hand a microprudential tool, while on the other hand
also convertible into a macroprudential tool when applied system-wide. An
additional means by which to adapt these tools to macroprudential purposes,
as also noted, is by employing then not only system-wide, but also
countergyc/ica/y system-wide. Hence, in order to 'lean against the wind' or 'take
away the punchbowl just as the party is getting good,' as former U.S. Fed
Chair William McChesney Martin would have put it, the regulator can lower
leverage and/or credit-extension ceilings, and/or boost reserve and/or capital
buffer requirements, and/or raise liquidity minima and/or lower maturity
mismatch maxima during boom phases, while doing the contrary during
slump phases." In so doing, the regulator would be applying the tools
'dynamically,' in order to employ them countercyclically.
Where the measures thus employed involve the accumulation of reserves
or buffers, they are sometimes amalgamated together in the literature under
60 See supra note 22 and corresponding text.
61 Former Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin used the punchbowl
metaphor in a speech before the New York Group of the Investment Bankers
Association of America. He said "The Federal Reserve, as one writer put it, after the
recent increase in the discount rate, is in the position of the chaperone who has ordered
the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up." William
McChesney Martin, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the New York Group of the
Investment Bankers Association of America (Oct. 19, 1955) (/ranscnpl available al
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/bistorical/martin/martin55-101 9.pdt).
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the rubric of 'dynamic provisioning.' The idea suggested is that of setting
aside during 'fat' years in order to provide for the subsequent 'lean' years.6 2
Once matters are viewed in this manner, another form of dynamic,
countercyclical provisioning, complementary to or even substitutable for the
others, springs also to mind. That is the form of provisioning popularly
known as deposit insurance. Although deposit insurance was developed first
as a risk-pooling device such as could instill confidence in bank depositors
that they would not lose their assets in the event of a bank run, thereby
lessening the likelihood of such runs themselves, it is also readily adapted to
macroprudential use. All that need be done is to require financial institutions
to fund the insurance pool more heavily during booms, and less heavily
during busts. In such case the pool operates as a system-wide countercyclical
buffer, which either can supplement or even, if need be, in some
circumstances replace, individual firm buffers.
That some jurisdictions have begun to view deposit insurance this way is
suggested by recent changes to some of those jurisdictions' insurance
regimes. In the U.S., for example, prior to 2005 the Federal Deposit
Insurance (FDI) scheme actually functioned procyclically, with 'assessments'
assessed (i.e., premia paid) only when the pool dropped below some
stipulated minimum, which of course tended to happen precisely when
unusually large numbers of banks were failing - hence when system-wide
difficulties tended to be occurring.63 Since 2005, however, the U.S. FDI
system has been incrementally reformed in a manner that renders it
countercycical in character, via changes both to the timing of premia
assessment and to the way in which pricing is managed, which is now risk-
based after a long period of 'one size fits all' pricing.6 4
62 See, e.g., Torsten Wezel, Jorge A. Chan-Lau & Francesco Columba, Dynamic Loan Loss
Provisioning, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 12/110, available al
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12110.pdf.
63 See Viral V Acharya et al., Systemaic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, FRBNY Economic
Policy Review 89, 91 (2010), available al
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/lOvl6nl/1008yoru.pdf (stating "The Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 brought some changes to the setting of insurance
premiums. In particular, the Act gave the DRR a range of 1.15 percent to 1.50 percent,
instead of a hard target of 1.25 percent. When DIF reserves exceed 1.50 percent (1.35
percent), 100 percent (50 percent) of the surplus is rebated to banks. If DIF reserves fall
below 1.15 percent, the FDIC must restore the fund and raise premiums to a level
sufficient to return reserves to the DRR range within five years.").
64 Idat 91.
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6. Cross-Sectoral Surveillance and Data Collection
just as the tools catalogued above all have been noted to be usable
dynamically and countercyclically in the interest of macroprudential
regulation, so have they all been noted to be best used cross-sectorally to the
same end. But this highlights one additional need opened up by the emerging
macroprudential 'toolkit.' That is the need for robust cross-sectoral data
collection and surveillance. If distinct sectoral regulators are effectively to
coordinate policies in the interest of managing the financial system as a
whole, it would seem that they will require access to the same bodies of
information, in order to better recognize when apparent stability in one sector
is in the process of being offset by mounting threats to the stability of
another sector.
This suggests that even in regulatory systems that divide responsibility
over multiple regulators, some information centralization is designed to
facilitate attention to systemic factors that is the hallmark of the
macroprudential perspective. Recognition of the wisdom of such policies is
perhaps registered in some recent legislation's - notably the Dodd-Frank
reforms in the U.S. - establishment of centralized financial information
gathering offices to assist councils of sectoral regulators.65 Of course, in
systems that do not divide responsibility over distinct sectoral regulators, this
information gathering function is apt already to be centralized within the
offices of the overall regulator. This takes U.S. on the matter of differing
possible divisions of macroprudential regulatory labor.
7. Site-Mitigation
The perception that some financial institutions during the recent crisis
were too big to permit to fail led both to hurried public efforts, in some cases,
to 'bail out' those institutions, and to heightened public panic, in other cases,
when such institutions were not bailed out.66  For this reason the
65 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act 5111 (establishing
FSOC), 161. (reporting by and examinations of nonbank financial companies by the
Board of Governors), 12 U.S.C. § 5321, 5361 (2013).
66 The Treasury Department bailed out many financial institutions through the Capital
Purchase Program. See Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
(last updated Nov. 7, 2012) available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investmentprograms/cap/Pages/contracts.aspx. Lehman
Brothers, by contrast, was not bailed out and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Bids To Hall Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape Of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES (Sep.
15, 2008), available at
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macroprudential toolkit also includes measures intended specifically to
mitigate or eliminate the 'too big to fail' problem. One such measure is
simply to 'downsize' such institutions and/or to prevent the emergence of
new such institutions. 67 Another such measure is to provide in advance for
the 'orderly liquidation' of such institutions in the event that they become
insolvent in future.68 Finally, yet another such measure is to subject the
relevant institutions, typically under some such regulatory designation as
'systemically important financial institutions' (SIFIs), to heightened renditions
of the regulatory requirements that figure into tools 1 through 6 above. 69
D. Who: Institutional Division(s) of Labor
The decision to add a macroprudential component to a finance-
regulatory regime opens another question additional to that of 'how,' or 'what
tools.' It also raises the question of what government agency. Various
options are available, as will be seen in detail in Part IV below. But several of
these options tend to be selected more often than others, for reasons that are
not difficult to discern.
1. Central Banks and Monetag Authorities
Probably the best situated preexisting authority to conduct
macroprudential oversight and regulation in most jurisdictions is either (a) the
central bank or monetary authority, or (b) some pairing or partnership that
combines the central bank or monetary authority with either (i) the treasury
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res- 9F01 ElDE1738F936A2575ACOA96E9
C8B63&ref-lehmanbrothersholdingsinc.
67 This has been proposed many times, including in the 2011 Annual Report of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. See Fed Reserve Bank of Dallas Ann. Rep. (2011), available al
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/fed/annual/2011/a11 .pdf. Independent
Community Bankers of America has also proposed this. See ICBA Speaks Oul on Too-Big-
To-Fail Downsizig, INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA, (July 26, 2012),
available at http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber-129810.
68 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act 5165(d)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C.
5365 (2013) (describing living wills as "The Board of Governors shall require each
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding
companies described in subsection (a) to report periodically to the Board of Governors,
the Council, and the Corporation the plan of such company for rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure,';.
69 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act 5804-808, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5463-5767 (2013) (establishing designation and examination of SIFIs).
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department or finance ministry, or (ii) some larger grouping that includes
both the latter and the former. There are several reasons.
The two principal reasons that the central bank or monetary authority is
well situated to play a macroprudential finance-regulatory role are (a) that
these authorities already play macroprudential mony-modulatory roles,70 while
(b) money-modulation for its part is quite cognate with, and a necessary
complement to, finance-regulation. Condition (b) holds true, in turn, in
virtue of (i) money's centrality to financial systems as reserve asset and
liquidity standard, and (ii) many financial instruments' - e.g., treasury
securities' - operating as close substitutes for money.71
To start with condition (b), 'financial stability,' understood as the absence
of volatile swings on the part of asset prices, is both structurally akin to and a
close complement of 'price stability,' understood as the absence of wild
swings on the part of consumer goods and services prices. So closely akin
are these phenomena, in fact, that it is difficult to see how either financial
stability or price stability could be maintained in the long run absent the other.
We shall accordingly return to this subject below in Part IVC, when we turn
to the matter of macroprudential finance-regulatory policy's interactions with
adjacent and overlapping policy fields. The principal point for present
purposes is that interdependence between financial and price stability requires
that central banks or monetary authorities be heard in connection with the
first if they are to discharge their critical functions in connection with the
second.
While the reason just noted sounds in necessity, the other reason for
central bank or monetary authority involvement in macroprudential
regulation sounds in expertise stemming from condition (a). The simple fact
is that maintaining financial stability is much like maintaining price stability -
as central banks already do - because financial stability just is price stability,
albeit of a particular kind. All that differs between the two cases is the class
of assets in question. Financial stability concerns the prices of financial
assets, while 'price' stability concerns the prices of nonfinancial goods and
services. For this reason, moreover, the principal challenge to both faces of
70 Id., see a/so BOARD OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS (2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfl .pdf#page-4.
71 United States treasury securities are traditionally considered very low risk, because they are
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. See, e.g., Individual
Bonds: US Treasury, FIDELITY, available at https://www.fidelity.com/fixed-income-
bonds/individual-bonds/us-treasury-bonds.
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stability is essentially the same - it is the recursive collective action problem
of the sort discussed earlier in Part II.A.
To see this, one need only note the structural identity between a
consumer price inflation on the one hand, and an asset price bubble - a
species of hyperinflation - on the other hand. What is common to both
cases is that it is rational in each of them for individuals to take part in and
thereby reinforce the price rise because in neither case can the individual
single-handedly prevent it while in both cases not to take part is to lose
money. To hold off from buying during a consumer price inflation that one
cannot stop, for example, is simply to ensure that one will have to pay more
for the item in question in the near future. To hold off from buying on credit
during a financial asset price inflation that one cannot stop, for its part, is
simply to 'leave money on the table' in the form of the spread between cheap
credit and high capital gains.12
The significance of this structural identity is that the solution to the
problem in both cases also takes the same form. Solution to a collective
action problem requires a collective agent empowered to act in the name of
all. That agent then acts on the requisite market as a whole by tightening the
money supply in the consumer price inflation, and by tightening the credit
supply in the asset price inflation. Because money and credit themselves
overlap, in turn - with credit constituting part of the money supply broadly
construed - it is not hard to see the sense in which central banks with
consumer price inflation fighting mandates are well situated to take on asset
price hyperinflation fighting mandates.
In short, then, owing to the close conceptual and practical links between
consumer price instability and financial price instability, central banks and
monetary authorities both have most need of involvement in
macroprudential finance-regulatory policy, and most experience with the
kinds of policy tools necessary to conduct such policy.
2. Treasug Departments and Finance Ministres
After the central bank or monetary authority, that government agency
best situated to play a role in maintaining financial stability macroprudentially
is the jurisdiction's treasury department or finance ministry. Again there are
several principal reasons.
One reason is that a nation's treasury or finance ministry is of course
charged with managing the financing of government operations, a function
72 See supra, Hockett note 10 and 11.
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that is much more readily discharged under conditions of financial stability
than otherwise. The treasury or finance ministry therefore has a significant
interest in the maintenance of financial stability just as the central bank or
monetary authority has an interest in the conduct of financial-stability-
maintenance.
A related reason is that the treasury or finance ministry, as an agent of
the executive of most governments, is much more directly a hand on the
financial system directed by the popular will than is the independent central
bank or monetary authority - at least in polities whose executives are
democratically elected. Hence the treasury or finance ministry can constitute
a democratic counterweight, in the conduct of macroprudential finance-
regulatory policy, to the politically insulated central bank or monetary
authority. Although discord between these two nodes of power could lead to
dysfunction, cooperative action by both can usefully combine independent
judgment with democratic responsiveness.
The final reason that a nation's treasury or finance ministry will tend
generally to be involved in the financial-stability-maintenance function is that
it will tend, in virtue of its role as financial agent of the government, to
maintain a comprehensive view of the financial system as a whole. A surview
of that kind, after all, gleaned in the course of seeking and exploiting all of
the best opportunities available for the financing of public operations, lends
itself to systemic oversight. Hence the treasury or finance ministry's ordinary
tasks and operations, like those of the central bank or monetary authority,
simply well situate it to play a macroprudential finance-regulatory role.
3. Piecemeal Sectoral Regulators
Another way in which to conduct macroprudential financial regulation is
simply to divide tasks and assign them to distinct sectoral regulators,
sometimes misleadingly labeled 'functional' regulators. A nation might assign
regulation of the full banking system to one regulator, for another, and
regulation of the securities industry to another. Insurance regulation might
be assigned to yet another regulator, and so on. Were it not for the Fed's role
in preserving price stability and the Treasury's sporadic interest in financial
system stability in the U.S., macroprudential regulation such as it has existed
in the U.S. over the past century or so would have followed this model. And
as it happens, during periods, such as the early years of the 211 century, in
which neither the Fed nor the Treasury took the macroprudential role
particularly seriously, this has indeed been the way of things in the U.S.
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The problem with this model, however, is that it tends to lend itself to
sector-specific macroprudential regulation at best, and dysfunctionally
fragmented microprudential regulation at worst. For in the absence of
significant coordination and collaboration by sectoral regulators, the arbitrage-
driven inter-sectoral linkage and convergence phenomena described above in
Part II.B will tend to outrun the adaptive capacities of the distinct sectoral
regulators.
In such cases securities regulators with no expertise in bank regulation
will then find themselves faced with bank-like MMMFs that they don't know
quite what to do with, while insurance regulators will be faced with de facto
derivatives issuers that they are not adequately equipped to regulate, and so
on. That will in turn mean that the finance-regulatory regime will be prone to
significant gaps over time, through which systemic risks works its way into
and throughout the financial system. Indeed, something much like this
appears to have occurred with the growth of the so-called 'shadow banking'
sector in the U.S., over a course of years during which neither the Greenspan
Fed nor the Treasury seem to have conceived their roles in robustly
macroprudential finance-regulatory terms."3
It is presumably for reasons such as these that the U.S. and other
jurisdictions have in recent years begun making serious efforts to bring
distinct functional regulators together on macroprudential finance-regulatory
councils, to more on which we now turn.
4. Unita, Twin Peaks,' 'Risk Council' and Other Pluralist Models
The final model pursuant to which macroprudential financial regulation
might be conducted involves bringing distinct sectoral regulators together in
one way or another, often with the central bank or monetary authority, and
the treasury or finance ministry, involved as swell. The U.K. and Japan, for
example, combined their sectoral regulators together into unitary Financial
Services Authorities (FSAs) in 2000, which then gradually came to work in
conjunction with the nations' central banks to conduct something like
macroprudential regulation in subsequent years.74 They accordingly moved
73 Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the Federal Reserve from August 11, 1987-January 31,
2006. This time period corresponded with a rapid growth in shadow banking. See
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, STAFF REPORT 458, SHADOW BANKING, 8
(2012) available al http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr458.pdf.
74 UK Financial Services Authority was later divided between Financial Conduct Authority
and Prudential Regulatory Authority. The Japanese Financial Service Authority, also
founded in 2000, still operates. See Slatement b the Commissioner. FINANCIAL SERVICES
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from fragmented, to unitary, to 'twin peaks' models of macroprudential
finance-regulator.
The U.S., for its part, established a semiformal President's Working
Group (PWG) in the 1990s to do much the same that the British and
Japanese 'twin peaks' models did, then formalized the arrangement in the
form of a Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) with the Dodd-Frank
legislation of 2010.11 The European Union, as we shall see in more detail
below, also has moved toward something like this 'risk council' model.6 And
in a sense, the Fund itself, along with the BIS, can be seen as a species global
'risk council.' What all of these variations have in common is that they seek
explicitly to avoid the dangers associated with regulatory fragmentation, in
order in turn to ensure that the financial system is monitored and regulated in
its entirety, all in the name of financial stability. They are accordingly
consolidative measures aimed at supplementing traditional microprudential
finance-regulation with a significant macroprudential component.
AGENCY, July 3, 2000, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20000703-
le.html.
75 Eric J. Pan, Four Cballenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REv. 743, 743 (2010)
("The President's Working Group on Financial Markets is a working group originally
convened at the order of the President of the United States. The working group consists
of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission."(citation omitted)); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 12 U.S.C.
5581, at §144 (establishing FSOC).
76 In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union formed the European
Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), an independent body to collect information, identify and
evaluate potential risks, issue warnings, make recommendations and facilitate cooperation.
The European Union also maintains the European System of Financial Supervisors
(ESFE), a micro-prudential network designed to harmonize rules between the European
Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the
European Securities Authority. See European Financial Supervision, EUROPA.EU, (last updated
Aug. 18, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/internal market/ single-market-services / financi
al services-general-framework/mi0017_en.htm.
77 The International Monetary Fund describes itself as an organization "working to foster
global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade,
promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around
the world." About the IM/IF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm. The Bank for International Settlements
describes its mission "to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial
stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central
banks." About BIS, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm.
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II. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION - LEGAL ISSUES AND TRADEOFFS
A. Legal Issues and Tradeoffs Common to Macroprudential and
Microprudential Regulation
Not all legal issues and tradeoffs implicated by macroprudential finance-
regulatory policies are unique to those policies. Some are implicated by
financial regulation irrespective of its micro- or macro-orientation. It will
accordingly be helpful first to briefly catalogue the latter, then to isolate and
more fully discuss the issues and tradeoffs implicated by the shift to a
macroprudential regulatory perspective in particular. The legal issues and
tradeoffs implicated by financial regulation in general, irrespective of its
micro- or macro-orientation, are apt to be more or less familiar to many. It
will accordingly suffice to note them briefly in passing.
1. Nondelegation Norms vs. Necessar Expertise, Discretion, and Political Independence
One tradeoff necessitated by all forms of financial regulation appears to
be likewise necessitated by other forms of regulation, and has accordingly
been familiar since the rise of the 'administrative state' early in the twentieth
century. This is the tradeoff between nondelegation norms on the one hand,
and necessary administrative expertise, discretion, and political independence
on the other hand.
The idea of 'nondelegation' stems from the ideals of democratic
governance and separation of powers that gained currency in the early
decades of the modern era. Pursuant to these norms, legislation on the one
hand, and execution of the laws on the other hand, were to be strictly
separated, with the former determined by careful democratic deliberation
responsive to the popular will, and the latter conducted by popularly elected
executors.
The need proactively to regulate increasingly risky, externality-imposing
economic activities that emerged in the late 19,h and early 201h centuries,
however, raised challenges to the comfortable democratic governance and
separation of powers images of a century earlier. Many regulatory tasks
required more expertise, and more flexible means of norm-generation and -
enforcement, than could be reasonably expected of democratically elected
legislatures. Certain quasi-legislative functions accordingly began to devolve
upon agencies of the executive organs of government, with legislatures
simply conferring broadly articulated mandates upon regulators who then
supplied finer-grained rules meant to further the broad legislative purpose.
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Because this change sat uncomfortably with the earlier mentioned
constitutional norms, however, it became necessary for some legislatures and
courts to attempt to draw limits on just how much rule-making and -
enforcing discretion could be 'delegated' by legislation to executive
instrumentalities. These lines of demarcation have, ever since, been anything
but clear. Indeed they have tended to shift back and forth over time in the
form of changed legislation and changed court-elaborated doctrine. Hence
the limits on delegation are ever-contested and ever-shifting.
In the realm of finance and other high stakes spheres of endeavor - e.g.,
public health and nuclear energy - the balance between nondelegation and
discretion-conferral has tended in general to be drawn in favor of the latter.
The thought is that finance is a highly technical subject demanding significant
expertise of those who would understand it, hence regulate it, while the
average legislator is lacking in that expertise. Finance-regulatory regimes
accordingly tend to confer broad spheres of discretion upon regulators.
A distinct but related reason for such conferrals of discretion is that
finance and its regulation tend to bear quite directly, in the short term, upon
the fortunes of the citizenry, such as to render the manipulation of finance-
regulatory norms tempting to political figures hoping to induce fleeting
senses of wellbeing among populations in the months leading up to elections.
Because such actions can be economically harmful in the longer term - after
elections have been held - it is thought that some measure of independence
from the political process on the part of financial regulators makes for
prudent policy.
The idea is more or less identical to its counterparts in familiar arguments
in favor of central bank independence and even judicial independence, even
if somewhat less compelling in the one case than in the others. In any event,
the fact that the argument is accepted and financial regulators accordingly
endowed with considerable discretion should not obscure the fact that a
tradeoff is made. Any jurisdiction that adopts macroprudential finance-
regulatory measures will accordingly have to take a position along these lines,
determining how much in the way of democratic accountability and
separation of powers it is willing to sacrifice in the name of discretion and
political independence on the part of financial regulators.
It bears noting, however, that this nearly as true of microprudential as it
is of macroprudential financial regulation. Such additional difficulties as
macroprudential regulation occasions are treated further below.
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2. Transparengy and Accountabiiy Norms vs. Necessar Expertise, Discretion, and
Institutional Independence
Much of what was said in the foregoing subsection carries over to the
matter of regulatory transparency and accountability. Many of the same
considerations that lay behind the movement to democratic governance and
separated powers in the early modern era brought not only nondelegation
concerns, but also transparency and accountability concerns to the fore as
more and more erstwhile legislative functions devolved upon executive
agencies. The worry was that insofar as executive agencies, in contrast to
executives themselves, were not monitored and elected by the general public,
a 'democratic deficit' could come to characterize certain governmental
actions. One response to this growing perception was the imposition of
auditing and related requirements upon administrative agencies by legislatures.
A potential problem raised by this development, however, is that some
such transparency and accountability requirements can compromise
regulatory discretion and political independence much as can nondelegation
norms. There is accordingly a similar tradeoff here, with various degrees of
discretion and independence coming at the expense of transparency and
accountability, and vice versa. In some cases, this tradeoff can become quite
acute. A financial regulator might, for example, find it much easier to acquire
necessary information from a regulated entity insofar as it can credibly
commit to that entity not to share the information with its competitors. A
transparency requirement pursuant to which the regulator is required to make
public such information can accordingly compromise its mission in a serious
way. Like remarks hold more acutely still of much that central banks and
monetary authorities do pursuant to their mandates.
As before with nondelegation, so here, the tradeoff in question is not
unique to macroprudential finance-regulatory regimes. It is present in all
forms of financial regulation. Also once again, however, this should not
obscure the fact that the adoption of new macroprudential finance-regulatory
measures involves taking a position in respect of these classic tradeoff
questions. Nor should it obscure the fact that macroprudential measures can
in some cases render these familiar tradeoffs yet more acute, as we shall see in
the following subsections.
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B. Legal Issues and Trade-offs Raised by Macroprudential
Regulation's Inherently Systemic and Cross-Sectoral Character
We turn now to legal issues and tradeoffs raised by macroprudential
finance-regulatory policies in virtue of their specifically macro -orientation.
These issues are, not surprisingly, best understood by reference to those
attributes of macroprudential regulation that were noted above to be
distinctive of this orientation. The first such attribute in connection with
which legal challenges are raised is macroprudential regulation's attention to
cross-institutional and -sectoral linkages and inter- substitutabilities.
1. Divisions of Regulatogy Authoriy and Inter-Regulator Cooperation
Because the macroprudential approach to financial regulation is
inherently not only cross-institutional, but also cross-sectoral in character,
effecting it can be difficult in jurisdictions in which distinct financial
institution types are subject to distinct regulators with distinct statutory
mandates. Such is the case, among other jurisdictions, in the U.S., which has
one of the world's more fragmented finance-regulatory regimes."
Separate banking, broker-dealer, and insurance regulators, for example,
when they exist, gather distinct bodies of data and regulate distinct clusters of
institutions pursuant to distinct bodies of substantive rules. 9 Yet where
78 RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RECENT CRISIS REAFFIRMS
THE NEED TO OVERHAL THE U.S. REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1049T. ("Given the importance of the U.S.
financial sector to the domestic and international economies, in January 2009, we also
added modernization of its outdated regulatory system as a new area to our list of high-
risk areas of government operations because of the fragmented and outdated regulatory
structure.").
79 In the United States, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
supervises FDIC-insured state chartered banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System and FDIC-insured branches of foreign banks. See FDIC Enforcement
Decisions and Orders, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www5.fdic.gov/EDO/index.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013). The Federal Reserve supervises state member banks, bank
holding companies and nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies. See also
Enforcement Actions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/default.aspx (last visited Nov.
3, 2013). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises national banks and
federal thrifts. About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, available
at http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2013). The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is a not-for-profit
organization that examines securities firms and broker-dealers for compliance with
FINRA-rules. About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
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transactional linkages and consequent interdependencies occur among
institutions of distinct types, the effectiveness of one regulator will tend to
depend upon the effectiveness of, along with information-sharing and other
forms of cooperation and collaboration with, another regulator possessed of
distinct jurisdictional authority. And where functional convergences occur
between nominally distinct financial institution types, such that Type B
institutions increasing afford products and services akin to those traditionally
offered by Type A institutions, Type B regulators' success is more apt to be
secured insofar as they are able to learn from the prior experience of Type A
regulators.
System-wide regulatory efficacy under such circumstances will thus tend
to ride on the specific division of regulatory authority, the effectiveness of
each distinct regulator, and the degree to which regulators are able and willing
to cooperate. The first and third of these factors are of course significantly
determined by statute. The legislature must decide both how many, if any,
distinct sectoral regulators there will be, and how cooperation and
collaboration among them is to be secured in the event that there is more
than one. A number of options, each discussed below, are available on this
score.
2. Interactions with Overlapping and Adjacent Policy Spaces - e.g., Credit-A/location and
Monetarp Policies
Beyond matters of cooperation between distinct regulators within the
financial system, there is the separate but related matter of interactions
between macroprudential finance-regulatory policy on the one hand, and
adjacent policy spaces on the other hand.
Owing to the money-like properties of many financial instruments and
transaction-types, for example, much in the way of cross-sectoral finance-
regulatory policy of the sort characteristic of the macroprudential perspective
cannot but affect the 'money supply' broadly construed, hence the
effectiveness of the monetary authority in the event it is distinct from the
macroprudential finance-regulatory authority. Similarly, much in the way of
monetary policy can be expected to affect the success of macroprudential
finance-regulatory policy in these circumstances.
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). Insurance is regulated
by individual states. GEN. SERv. ADMIN. CONSUMER ACTION HANDBOOK 110 (2013),
available al http://www.usa.gov/topics/consumer/insurance.pdf.
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But this means in turn that if a nation's monetary authority on the one
hand and financial regulator(s) on the other are distinct, they will be faced
with a challenge much like that faced by distinct finance-sectoral regulators as
noted in the previous subsection. Effective cooperation will be requisite to
each authority's success, as will be the means of determining how best to
'balance' distinct policy objectives in the event they conflict as they sometimes
might.
The legislature of the jurisdiction in question must accordingly take at
least one and possibly more than one measure. First, it must either
determine, or delegate to some office the authority to determine, how best to
reconcile conflicts of objective; this must be done even if the monetary and
macroprudential finance-regulatory authorities are one and the same agency -
e.g., the central bank. And second, it must determine, in the event that the
monetary authority and macroprudential finance-regulatory authority are
distinct, how best to ensure cooperation between these authorities - just as it
must do in the case of distinct sectoral regulators within the finance-
regulatory system itself.
Similar remarks hold in connection with other policy spaces from within
which public action can collaterally affect the effectiveness of
macroprudential financial regulation and vice versa. Many nations adopt
policies meant to allocate credit on particularly favorable terms to certain
sectors deemed worthy of special solicitude for cultural, historical, or other
reasons.80 Most nations have policies of this sort in respect of certain
traditional and culturally resonant agricultural subsectors, for example - e.g.,
rice in Japan, cheeses and wines in much of Europe, and 'small family farms'
in the U.S.81 Many also have policies of this sort in respect of higher
education, home finance, and small business enterprises.8 2
80 See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No. 479/2008 on the
Common Organisation of the Market in Wine, 148 O.J. L. 1 (2008), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri- OJ:L:2008:148:0001:0061 :EN:PDF;
Kathleen Masterson, Farm Bill: From Cbaritable S/art to Prime Budget Target, NATL. PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 26, 2011, 12:41PM), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2011/09/26/140802243/the- farm-bill from-
charitable- start-to-prime-budget-target.
81 See Anthony Kuhn, Japan's Rice Farmers See Trade Deal as Threal To Tradition, NATI'L PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:02AM), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/09/17/2230965 76/japans-rice- farmers- see-
trade-deal-as-threat-to-tradition; Brief History of Wine, N.Y TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/05/timestopics/topics-winehistory.html; Timeline of
Farming in the US., PUB. BROAD. SERV.,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/trouble/timeline/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Information
on Cbeeses, NORBITON FINE CHEESE Co., available at
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In all such cases, the centrality of credit to the financial system entails
that macroprudential finance-regulatory policies will bear upon the success of
particular authorities charged with favorable credit-allocation in the adjacent
spaces. Depending upon the sizes of those spaces, in turn, effects will run in
the other direction as well. In the U.S., for example, home finance represents
a very large portion indeed of financial flows - as do, to a lesser extent,
higher education and small business finance.83 But this means that the U.S.
has had to develop means by which the aims of the central bank and financial
regulators are to be reconciled with those of the Federal Housing
Administration and the secondary mortgage market makers Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the Department of Education, and the Small Business
Administration, as will be discussed more fully below.
3. Accountabiliy and Dfficulties in Measuring 'Success'
Another legal challenge uniquely raised by the shift to a macroprudential
finance-regulatory orientation links up with the accountability norms to which
many jurisdictions hold regulators. To be held accountable, regulators must
be evaluable in relation to goals that are statutorily set for them. 'Success'
then can be understood by reference to the objectives in question and how
effective the regulators are in achieving them.
Insofar as regulators act in keeping with microprudential regulatory goals,
the measure of 'success' is relatively simple and straightforward. After all, the
safety and soundness of particular institutions and their practices can
generally be ascertained by reference to those institutions' profitability and
continuing viability over time. And even when some institutions get into
trouble or fail, if the number of such institutions represents a relatively small
http://www.norbitoncheese.co.uk/stock/Stock.aspx?LinldD- 4&SubLinldD- 16 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
82 See Direct Loans, U.S. DEPT. OF ED., http://www.direct.ed.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013);
accord Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
83 In the United States, total credit market debt outstanding as of September 1 5 th, 2013, was
$41,041.6 billion. Home mortgages, included in the total, amounted to $9345.8 billion.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SyS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE SECOND QUARTER 2013 at 5 (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zl.pdf. The value of small business
loans outstanding from depository leaders at the end of 2012 was $578.8 billion. OFFICE
OF ADVOCACY U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED
STATES 2012 at 5 (2012), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/sb l_2study.pdf.
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fraction of all institutions in the sector in question, a regulator can plausibly
be deemed to have carried out its mandate with relative success.
When the scope of regulatory concern broadens to encompass a more
diffusely described goal such as 'systemic risk reduction' or 'financial stability,'
on the other hand, the measure of regulatory success can become somewhat
more slippery. A certain degree of 'cycling' in the valuation of particular
classes of financial asset would seem to be inevitable in any secondary-
market-inclusive financial system, and it is not immediately apparent what
range of possible peak and trough amplitudes is the 'correct' or 'optimal' one.
This would be the case even were financial instruments limited to a small
number of types that remained invariant over time. It is accordingly all the
more true in a system, such as that with which we actually live, in which new
classes of asset are invented all of the time. For in respect of new asset
classes, greater swings between peak and trough can be reasonably expected
and tolerated early on in their 'lives' than after they have established
themselves.
While this problem, as just characterized, might strike the U.S. as a
practical one, it is critical to note that it's also a legal one. For again, real
accountability requires real measures of success, and difficulties in
ascertaining what should count as success accordingly translate into
difficulties in holding regulators to account. This might indeed constitute the
most significant legal challenge facing the move to macroprudential finance-
regulatory policy.
The problem should not be overstated, however. Open-ended desiderata
such as 'systemic risk reduction' or 'financial stability' need not constitute the
canonical articulations of regulatory aims in a macroprudential finance-
regulatory regime. The regime might instead stipulate that specific average
cross-sectoral leverage rates, credit-growth rates, maturity mismatch maxima,
capital buffer and countercyclical provisioning amounts as regulatory goals -
goals set in the interest of systemic risk reduction or financial stability. Then
regulators can be held to account according as they succeed in maintaining
those rates and amounts.
Of course, this solution to the problem might be viewed as simply
shifting it to another sphere - namely, that in which we determine how much
deference to pay technocratic expertise in its determination of what rates and
amounts are 'best,' as discussed in the previous subsection. But this simply
means that we'll have converted a legal challenge unique to macroprudential
financial regulation back into a challenge which always has afflicted financial -
and other forms of expertise-requiring - regulation more generally.
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C. Legal Issues and Trade-Offs Raised by Macroprudential
Regulation's Inherently Countercyclical, Hence 'Dynamic,' Character
While some legal issues uniquely raised by macroprudential financial
regulation stem from its inherently systemic and cross-sectoral character,
others stem from its inherently countercyclical hence dynamic character.
Because these latter characteristics, moreover, are probably those most
uniquely distinctive of macroprudential in contrast to microprudential
regulation as noted in Part II, the legal issues they raise are correspondingly
distinctive.
1. Procedural Requirements on Rulemaking and Enforcement vs. the Needfor Rapid
Response
Because credit and leverage growth in a financial system typically can
proceed in 'fits and starts' fashion, with sudden changes of rate, the
determination and enforcement of specific LTV, DTI, credit outstanding,
liquidity, maturity mismatch, capital, and countercyclical buffer provisioning
measures in the name of financial stability must sometimes be done very
quickly, with little time for public deliberation or comment. 84 At least that is
so if macroprudential financial regulation is to be finely tuned and responsive
in the way that the justifications for this change of regulatory focus would
suggest.
The problem, of course, is that this need for 'rapid response' style
regulatory flexibility, so characteristic of the macroprudential approach to
financial regulation, conflicts very starkly with the constitutional norms to
which many jurisdictions hold administrative agencies accountable. The
principal point behind these norms is of course to ensure an opportunity for
all parties that stand to be affected by a regulatory provision to contribute to
the regulator's deliberations in formulating and implementing it. But wide-
scale deliberation of course rests in tension with dispatch. A jurisdiction that
would put macroprudential finance-regulatory regimes in place is accordingly
faced with a straightforward tradeoff. Deliberation entails an expense in the
form of dispatch, and dispatch entails an expense in the form of deliberation.
84 For example, the housing market and growth of commercial mortgage-backed securities,
which grew approximately 50% in the first quarter of 2006. See US. Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Secrhlies (CMBS) Issuance, MARCUS & MILLICHAP RESEARCH SERVICES, available al
http://marcusmillichap.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/graph-lg.png (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
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Once again, however, the problem should not be overstated. A decision
hastily made can presumably likewise be hastily unmade, should the regulator
in question prove to have erred on the side of caution in responding rapidly
to a sudden change in credit or leverage growth rates within the financial
system. Moreover, insofar as all financial regulation, micro- and
macroprudential alike, requires expertise and accordingly involves broad
conferrals of discretion upon most financial regulators worldwide, the
conferral of 'rapid response' authority upon macroprudential regulators can
itself be considered not all that unusual. Questions concerning the timing of
regulatory impositions, after all, would seem to be as much matters of
expertise as are questions concerning the substance of those impositions.
2. Procedural Limitations on Enforcement Authoriy and the Need of Regu/atorzy
Relevant Information
Many of the observations just made on the tradeoff between rapid
regulatory response capability on the one hand and procedural limitations on
regulators on the other hand carry over, albeit in somewhat attenuated form,
to the information-gathering functions of regulators.
In order to apply macroprudential finance-regulatory tools of the kind
catalogued in Part II.C, regulators must be able to track measures of credit
growth, leverage growth, liquidity and capital measures, and like variables not
only within specific sectors of the financial system, but across such sectors as
well. In order to respond to excesses in the measures in question with
optimal celerity, moreover, they must be empowered to gather the requisite
information with great frequency. Hence once again, expedition is critical to
the regulatory task.
The same norms pursuant to which many jurisdictions aim to slow the
regulatory process in order to ensure deliberation, however, to some extent
also militate against excessive intrusion on the part of regulators into the daily
operations of private actors. Hence the 'time element' added to financial
regulation by the macroprudential perspective might in some cases carry
financial regulation farther in the direction of 'command and control' style
regulation than some political cultures might find acceptable.
This problem, too, however, can be overstated. After all, a jurisdiction
that elects to include 'rapid response' authority among the powers conferred
upon regulators in the name of macroprudential supervision would appear to
be operating at crossed-purposes were it in the same breath to deny the
regulator authority to gather information with the frequency requisite to
carrying out the rapid response mandate. It is probably best, therefore, to
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handle this difficulty in the same enactment as resolves the tradeoff question
addressed in the previous subsection.
III. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION ON THE BOOKS - SOME
REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND STATUTORY
LEVERS
We now turn to some sample macroprudential financial oversight and
regulatory measures adopted by several leading jurisdictions since the global
financial turmoil of 2008 and 2009 - the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U. In some
cases, some of the measures discussed were initiated shortly prior to 2008 -
for example, in 2005 in the U.S. In other cases, some of the measures
discussed were initiated even earlier - for example, in 1998 in the U.K. and
1999 in the U.S. Because they were initiated partly in anticipation of
worsening financial conditions that already had shown themselves to be
dangerous by the turn of the new century or midway through the last decade,
however, and because subsequently adopted measures partly built upon them,
they too figure at least marginally into the discussion below.
A. Two Kinds of Measure: Institutional and Behavioral Standard-
Setting
The measures here discussed also can be helpfully considered under two
distinct categories. One is the category of what we shall call 'institutional'
measures. The other is that of what we shall call 'behavioral standard-setting'
measures. Measures of the former kind are rules or directives to which
private market actors are subject, put into place by legislatures and/or
finance-regulatory bodies in order to modulate procyclicalities, cross-sectoral
linkages, and associated buildups of systemic risk in financial markets.
1. Institutional Measures
Institutional measures are administrative reorganizations or cognate
changes meant to render the project of governmental finance-regulatory
oversight more efficient and effective. These correspond to the 'Who?'
question considered above in Part II.D. As we shall see, a variety of
arrangements have been decided upon in recent years.
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2. Standard-Setting Measures
Standard-setting measures are rules or directives to which private market
actors are subject, put into place by legislatures and/or finance-regulatory
bodies in order to modulate procyclicalities, cross-sectoral linkages, and
associated buildups of systemic risk in financial markets. Most of those we
consider here figure as 'tools' in the 'macroprudential toolkit' elaborated in
response to the 'How?' question addressed above in Part II.C.
B. The United States
The U.S. has in recent years adopted institutional and standard-setting
reforms alike. As more fully elaborated below, it has adopted limited versions
of macroprudential policy tools (3), (4) and (5) - reserve and capital buffer
requirements, dynamic provisioning, and liquidity minima and maturity
mismatch maxima - listed above. It has also adopted more robust versions
of tools (6) and (7) - cross-sectoral surveillance and data collection on the
one hand, and mitigating the TBTF problem on the other.85
In connection with the latter, in turn, it has also adopted institutional
reforms that complement them. Finally, the U.S. long has had tools of types
(1) and (2) - credit and leverage regulation - though it has not thus far
employed them with macroprudential aims forthrightly in mind. It should
also be noted that in all of these cases, the U.S. regime is more proactively
macroprudential in character where commercial banks are concerned than
where other financial institution types are concerned, meaning in turn that its
tools thus far are less cross-sectoral in character than they could be.
1. Institutional Measures
With respect to institutional features of U.S. macroprudential finance-
regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act takes particularly significant strides in the
direction of unifying the erstwhile separate functioning of distinct so-called
'functional' regulators. Many American commentators attributed the buildup
of system risk in the lead up to 2008 at least partly in the fact that the U.S.'s
several bank regulators, its securities and investment company regulators, and
85 Eric J. Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REv. 743, 743-744
(2010) (stating that "Regulators could have helped address the risk management
weaknesses at the large financial institutions if they exercised tougher prudential
supervisory oversight.").
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its state insurance regulators all focused on particular subsectors of the
financial system, thereby missing the systemic risk forest for the institutional
trees. This was the case notwithstanding the partial consolidation of once
even more diffuse financial regulators brought by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
Dodd-Frank accordingly establishes a central council with two critical
attributes. The first is the bringing all of the functional regulators, together
with the Treasury Department and the central bank - the Fed - into regular
shared deliberation.16 The second such is empowering the Council qua
council with particular powers - notably the SIFI-designation power as
mentioned above, which is paired with authority to promulgate heightened
behavioral standards applicable to the same.8
2. Standard-Setting Measures
As noted before, the U.S. also has adopted reforms in the realm of
behavioral standard-setting, in the form of 'tools' that the macroprudential
'toolkit' discuss above in Part II.C includes.
With respect to tools (3), (4) and (5) - reserve and capital buffer
requirements, dynamic provisioning, and liquidity minima and maturity
mismatch maxima - the U.S. has long had less explicitly macroprudential
versions of such requirements in its finance regulatory regimes. Reserve
requirements have been imposed upon commercial banks under Federal
Reserve Regulation D since many decades ago, and capital regulation has been
a prominent feature of U.S. banking law under the aegis of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for nearly as long."8
The Net Capital Rule as administered by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) subjects securities firms to (lighter forms of) capital
regulation as well; and the SEC imposes similar rules, varying with the kind of
fund in question, upon mutual funds and other investment companies.8 9
86 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111 -203,
§111, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (establishing the Federal Stability Oversight Council).
87 Id. at § 804-808 (detailing designation and examination of SIFIs).
88 Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Deposilog Institutions 12 CFR 204, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE 8Sy., available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regdcg.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013);
Regulalory Capital, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/capital/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
89 See Broker-Dealer Net Capital and Books and Records Guidance, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N,
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdnetcapital.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2013).
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Finally, capital regulation also figures among the core regulatory tools
employed by the fifty U.S. state insurance regulators, who are the primary
regulators of the U.S. insurance industry under the McCarran Ferguson Act
of 1946.90 In all of these cases, moreover, ready liquidity on the part of an
institution, and/or low degrees of maturity mismatch as between assets and
liabilities, have entitled financial institutions to hold smaller capital buffers.
What has changed in the U.S. with respect to tools (3), (4) and (5) since the
recent financial turmoil, however, is the explicit recognition of their
macroprudential significance. Whereas reserve and capital buffer
requirements and their periodic adjustment were viewed and employed prior
to the crisis primarily for microprudential aims sounding in institutional safety
and soundness, since the crisis they have come to be recognized having a
bearing on systemic risk and financial instability as well. 91 This is particularly
so where banks are concerned, and it is particularly evident in the explicit
embrace by the U.S. Federal Reserve of Basel III's recommended
'countercyclical buffer' requirement. 92 Of course, for so long as the U.S., like
most of the Fund's Member Countries with large economies, remains mired
in macroeconomic slump, there will be little if any occasion to test regulators'
willingness to use these tools to 'lean against the wind' during boom times.
But the fact that a readiness to do so is now explicitly embraced constitutes
an important shift in U.S. policy toward macroprudential financial oversight.
It should also be noted here that, at least with respect to commercial
banks, the U.S. has had a de facto macroprudentially oriented, dynamic
countercyclical provisioning regime in place since 2005-06 in the guise of its
Federal Deposit Insurance system. The reference here is to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Conforming Amendments Act of 2005 (enacted in 2006).91 These reforms to
the U.S. deposit insurance system both (1) converted what had been a
procyclical funding mechanism, pursuant to which premia were assessed only
when the insurance pool fell below certain threshold levels, to a
90 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1945).
91 See, e.g., THE FINANCIAL INQUIRY CRISIS REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATE, submitted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission pursuant to Public Law
111-21 at 151-155 (2011).
92 See Base! Reg/a o Capital Framework: U.S. Imp/emena o of Basel Accords, FED. RESERVE
BD., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013).
93 Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 5 2101-2109, 120
Stat. 9 (2006); Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of
2005,Pub. L. No. 109-173, 119 Stat. 3601 (2006).
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countercyclical mechanism pursuant to which premia were collected in
'boom' times; and (2) explicitly tied premia amounts to bank asset
characteristics pursuant to a system of forthright 'risk-pricing.' Both changes
of course converted the deposit insurance system into a sort of pooled
dynamic provisioning system.94
Turning next to tools (6) and (7) - cross-sectoral surveillance and data
collection on the one hand, and mitigating the TBTF problem on the other -
it is here that the U.S. has introduced the greatest degree of change in a
macroprudential direction since the crisis of 2008-09. With respect to the
first of those, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 shifts regulatory focus directly
toward system-wide risk in several ways. Two of these ways are institutional
in nature, and hence are discussed more fully below. The short-playing
version worth providing here is that Title I of the Act establishes a Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and associated Office of Financial
Research (OFB).95 The first of these organs explicitly combines presently
distinct sector-specific regulators to facilitate oversight of the financial system
as a whole, while the second of them is charged with collecting data system-
wide that can helpfully inform the Council's deliberations.96
Dodd-Frank shifts regulatory focus to the financial system as a whole in
other ways: namely, by bringing under federal oversight and regulatory
authority a sizable number of sectors and transactions that previously went
unregulated either at the federal level or even at any level at all. Title IV, for
example, covers hedge fund advisors. 97 Title V establishes a new national
insurance overseer who, although s/he is not yet authorized to regulate, is
authorized to collect data and charged with commencing deliberation on the
relative advantages and disadvantages of federalizing insurance regulation.98
Finally, Title VIII brings many payment, clearing, and settlement systems -
including those used in derivative transactions - under federal regulatory
94 Id.
95 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,
112(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat 1376 (2010) ("to identify risks to the financial stability of the United
States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities,
of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that
could arise outside the financial services marketplace"); Id. § 153(a)(1) ("collecting data on
behalf of the Council, and providing such data to the Council and member agencies").
96 Id.
97 Id. § 401-416.
98 Id. §401, 403 (amending the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to eliminate the Private
Advisor Exemption).
9:201 (2015)
The Macroprudential Turn
authority.99  Through all of these means Dodd-Frank aims to expand
coverage of federal oversight and regulatory authority to subsectors of the
financial services industry that had previously escaped systematic scrutiny.
On dealing with the too big to fail ('TBTF') problem, here too the U.S.
has introduced fundamental changes since the recent crisis. While it has not
thus far elected to break up TBTF institutions or prevent their coming into
existence, the U.S. has adopted two other canonical means of addressing the
special risks that they pose - viz. providing ex ante for their orderly
liquidation, and imposing more stringent versions of the other
macroprudential tools to them. With respect to the first of these, Title II [the
language cited comes from Title I] of Dodd-Frank requires that the FSOC
designate certain financial institutions as 'systemically significant' ('SIFIs) on
the basis of certain criteria, then require that those institutions draw up so-
called 'living wills' that can assist the FDIC in liquidating them in an orderly
way, patterned after the FDIC bank resolution scheme, should they fail.100
The Act also vests the FDIC with the liquidation authority there
referenced.101 Finally, any institution's being designated a SIFI by the FSOC
under Title I also triggers heightened liquidity and capital regulatory standards
meant to offset the added element of systemic risk brought by large size and
interconnectedness.1 02
Turning now to tools (1) and (2) in the toolkit - credit and leverage
regulation - as mentioned before the U.S. has long had versions of these tools
available, but has not until recently viewed them as macroprudential in nature.
That is now beginning to change, partly in owing to changes of attitude
toward macroprudential regulation at the U.S. Federal Reserve, and partly in
owing to Title XIV of Dodd-Frank.
99 Id. §502(c)(1)(A) (creating a Director for the Federal Insurance Officer who is tasked "to
monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the
regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry
or the United States financial system").
100 Id. §165(d)(1)(A) (describing living wills as "[t]he Board of Governors shall require each
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding
companies described in subsection (a) to report periodically to the Board of Governors,
the Council, and the Corporation the plan of such company for rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure").
101 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,
§201 (a)(1)(A), 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (noting that the "Corporation" will act as receiver); Id.
§ 2(7) (noting that the "Corporation" is the "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation").
102 Id. §113(a)(2)(G) (considerations in designating a SIFI include the "nature, scope, size,
scale, concentration, interconnectedness, [and] mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank
financial company").
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With respect to credit regulation, mandatory portfolio diversification
requirements have long been a part of U.S. commercial bank regulation, while
reserve requirements along with capital buffer requirements, as mentioned
before, have limited total credit exposures on the part of U.S. banks.103 Less
stringent counterparts have long applied to U.S. securities firms, investment
companies, and insurance companies. 10 4 Until the recent crisis, however,
these were viewed mainly as microprudential regulatory tools, geared toward
ensuring the safety and soundness of individual institutions. One way in
which this has changed since 2010 takes the form of the aforementioned
prospect of SIFI designation by the FSOC under Dodd-Franks, as the scope
and nature of a financial institution's counterparty relations figures into
determinations of interconnectedness which in turn partly determine
systemic importance. 10 5
With respect to leverage regulation, the U.S. Federal Reserve had
authority, even prior to the real estate boom and bust that triggered the recent
financial turmoils, to regulate mortgage origination and, with it, LTVs and
DTIs.106 In late 1990s and early 2000s, however, the Fed did not avail itself
of that authority - perhaps partly because here too the tools were viewed
mainly in microprudential terms. Title IV of Dodd-Frank, however, changes
the regulatory terrain both by requiring use of these tools in determining -
and enforcing - mortgage loan standards and by vesting rule-making and
enforcement authority under these requirements in a new regulatory agency -
viz. the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established by Title X
of Dodd-Frank as a semi-autonomous agency housed within the Fed.10
Standards with respect to LTV and DTI figure into Subtitles A and B, on
mortgage loan and loan origination standards, in particular.
103 See Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2013) (detailing capital requirements); Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements:
History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, June 1993,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/0693lead.pdf.
104 Securities firms, investment companies and insurance companies are not subject to the
regulations above. Further, as discussed in shadow banking, they are often not subject to
as strict of regulation.
105 See Dodd-Frank Act at §113(a)(2)(G). Considerations in designating a SIFI include "the
nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of
the company."
106 The vast majority of mortgage lenders are required to report mortgage applications and
originations to the Federal Reserve, enacted by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801-2809 (1976). This authority was transferred to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in 2011, 12 U.S.C. § 2804 (2012).
107 Dodd-Frank Act at §1011 (creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
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C. The United Kingdom
The U.K. has in many ways been ahead of the proverbial 'curve' where
the shift to a macroprudential-inclusive finance-regulatory focus is concerned.
Its Financial Services Act (FS Act) of 1998 appears to be the first piece of
legislation in a globally significant financial jurisdiction to embrace
macroprudential policy explicitly.108  It also was first in simplifying the
finance-regulatory division of labor, by vesting macroprudential oversight
authority in the Bank of England (BoE) and cross-sectoral microprudential
finance-regulatory authority in a Financial Services Authority (FSA) which the
Act itself instituted. (The U.K. Treasury also took a role, where public funds
needed for lender of last resort functions were at stake.) Because these
measures antedated the development of the earlier mentioned
'macroprudential toolkit,' however, the FS Act did not expressly lay out
behavioral standard-setting measures couched in the terms enumerated above
as measures (1) through (7).
Since the financial turmoil of 2008-09, a number of governmental or
quasi-governmental authorities and inquiry commissions in the U.K., notably
the Vickers Commission and the Bank of England, have actively reassessed
the financial oversight system put into place in the wake of the FS Act of
1998.109 The ultimate upshot of these studies is the Financial Services Bill
(FS Bill of 2012), introduced in January of 2012 and effective April 1, 2013.110
The FS Bill includes both institutional changes and the adoption of several
'tools' from the macroprudential toolkit enumerated above. It will be
convenient to summarize these changes in the order just given.
1. Institutional Measures
Institutionally, then, the FS Bill of 2012 first both sharpens the BoE's
previous macroprudential mandate and transfers to the BoE the erstwhile
FSA's microprudential mandate. It effects the first of those changes by
establishing a macroprudential authority - the 'Financial Policy Committee'
108 Bank of England Act of 1998, c. 11, § 9(H), (L) (U.K.), amended by Financial Services Act,
2012, c. 21 (U.K.).
109 Id.
110 For a discussion on the impacts, see generally Jeffery Roberts, Financial Services Act 2012:
A New UK Financial Regulalog7 Framework, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation (Mar. 24, 2013, 9:04 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/24/financial-services-act-2012-a-new-
uk- financial-regulatory- framework/.
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(FPC) - within the BoE to monitor systemic risk in the financial economy1 1
It effects the second of those changes by establishing a microprudential
authority - the 'Prudential Regulation Authority' (PRA) within the BoE to
monitor individual financial firms for their institutional safety and
soundness. 112
The FS Bill of 2012 also establishes a new 'Financial Conduct Authority'
(FCA) outside of the BoE, which is to monitor the behavior of financial
firms with a view to consumer and investor interests. (The FCA can in this
sense be analogized to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
established by the U.S.'s Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, more on which below.)
Finally, the FS Bill of 2012 closes the FSA established by the FS Act of 1998,
since all of its erstwhile functions (and more) are assigned to the
aforementioned three entities.
2. Standard-Setting Measures
Turning from institutional to behavioral standard changes, the FS Bill of
2012 ('the Bill) expressly adopts multiple variants of most of the tools found
in the 'toolkit' elaborated above. What is more, as the concentration of all
macro- and all micro-prudential oversight functions in singular agencies
would suggest, the Bill adopts these measures in cross-sectoral form. With
respect to leverage regulation - tool (1) - for example, the Bill vests the FPC
with the authority and responsibility to impose loan to value (LTV) and loan
to income (LTI) restrictions on mortgage lending, and minimum margin
requirements applicable to secured financing and derivative transactions.1
With respect to dynamic reserve, capital, and liquidity requirements - tools
(3), (4) and (5) - the Bill vests the FPC with authority and responsibility to
impose both risk-weighted and leverage-based capital requirements, as well as
time-varying loss-provisioning and liquidity requirements, on a cross-sectoral
basis.114 The Bill also expressly adopts the countercyclical capital buffer
strategy recommended by the Basle III accord.1 5
111 Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21 § 4(1) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21 /part/2/crossheading/financial-conduct-
authority-and-prudential-regulation-authority/enacted.
112 Id. at§ 2.
113 Id. § 4(1)-9C(3)(c).
114 Id.
115 See BANK OF ENGLAND, DR-AFT POLICY STATEMENT, THE FINANCIAL POLICY
COMMITTEE'S POWERS TO SUPPLEMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 2013 (available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstabiity/Documents/fpc/poicystatementl301
14.PDF.).
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Where cross-sectoral surveillance and TBTF mitigation - tools (6) and (7)
- are concerned, the FS Bill also provides apposite measures. With respect to
surveillance, the Bill by its terms charges the newly established FPC with
monitoring systemic-risk-relevant practices trans-sectorally through the
financial system.11 6 It also specifies disclosure requirements, incumbent upon
all financial firms, with that cross-sectoral monitoring function in view.117 As
for "too big to fail", the Bill both imposes more restrictive versions of the
aforementioned standards upon certain designated systemically important
firms, and continues the earlier FS Act's policy of strategic ambiguity in
respect of the lender of last resort ('LOLR) function, in order to mitigate
'moral hazard' concerns that would be raised by forthright commitment to
'bail out' large firms in trouble. 8 The Bill also clarifies authority held by
Treasury with respect to BoE resolution functions, in the event of financial
turmoil and consequent firm failure, where public funds might be put at
risk.119
D. The European Union
The most far-reaching reforms thus far proposed in the E.U., none of
which has yet had time to be actually legislated, find articulation in the recent
Liikanen Commission Report ('Liikanen,' 'Report').120 The Report does not
make recommendations where institutional arrangements are concerned, but
it does have a good deal to say about standard-setting.
1. Institutional Measures
As just noted, the EU. has not yet undertaken regulatory-institutional
reform. The reasons are many, but chief among them is that the members
are still very much divided over a number of fundamental matters. One is
precisely what form the European Central Bank (ECB) should take, and what
powers it should wield, in the wake of the recent and perhaps still festering
116 See Bank of England Act, 1998,-c. 11, § 9C(3)(c) (UK).
117 Id. at 5 17.
118 Supranote 117.
119 Financial Services Act, 2012, ch. 21, 58 (U.K.).
120 Erkki Liikanen, et al., Final Report of the High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of
the EU Banking Sector, (Oct. 2, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/bank/docs/high-
level expert-group/report en.pdf.
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'Euro Crisis.' 121 Another is whether, and how, Europe should go about
regulating banks - for example, whether there should be a single European
banking compact and regulator, or whether bank regulation should continue
to be a primarily member state matter. These and cognate questions are
sufficiently fundamental and thorny - much more so even than questions
concerning how best to regulate macroprudentially - as to warrant passing
over them here. We accordingly proceed to standard-setting measures such as
Liikanen recommends to all E.U. member states.
2. Standard-Setling Measures
Most of the attention that Likanen has received thus far has been
grabbed by its ring-fencing-like proposal - a variation on Vickers in the U.K.
and Volcker in the U.S.122 The principal and by now quite familiar concern
animating such structural reform proposals is that depositors' funds neither
be used - nor find their way - into financing or funding that kind of activity.
An allied concern is to make clear that there is no explicit or implicit
government guarantee of the risk-taking entity simply by dint of its loose
connection to a deposit-taking entity within some financial group.
Liikanen's proposed structural reform is of course not a 'tool' in the
macroprudential toolkit elaborated above in Part II.C, any more than are
Vickers-style ringfencing or Volcker style account- segregation. It is important
to note, however, that Liikanen is not just a ring fencing proposal. There are
at least five distinct proposals made by Liikanen. And what is most striking
about these is how many similarities there are between them on the one hand
and what the U.S. and U.K. are now doing after counterpart official inquiries
of their own, as discussed just above, on the other hand.
The second salient proposal found in Liikanen, then, after ringfencing, is
an orderly liquidation authority (OLA) arrangement much like that which you
find in Dodd-Frank - tool (7) in the kit elaborated in II.C above.123 The OLA
121 For more on this, see, e.g., Robert Hockett, Were "It" To Happen: Contract Continuify Under
Euro Regime Change, 31.PA. J. INT'L L. 277 (2012); and Robert Hockett,, Op-Ed., Save
Europe' Marriage wilb a Trial Separation, BLOOMBERG, June 12, 2012) (available al
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-12/save-europe- s-marriage-with-a-trial-
separation.htmnl.).
122 Liikanen et al., supra note 120, at 85 (explaining that "A specific variant of functional
separation was proposed by the UK ICB in 2011. It recommended that large UK banks
should ring-fence their retail bank operations into separate legal subsidiaries with their
own prudential safeguards.';.
123 Id. at iii (asserting that "Second, the Group emphasizes the need for banks to draw up and
maintain effective and realistic recovery and resolution plans, as proposed in the
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recommendation connects up with the ring fencing pillar as well in Lilkanen,
in that the Report recommends that this pillar is necessary for the purposes
of arriving at a plausible liquidation, or living will plan, for a European
institution.124 Jurisdictions that follow Liikanen's recommendation might
even require yet stricter separation, between the proprietary risk-taking
activities on the one hand and deposit-taking activities on the other hand, of
institutions that are large or interconnected enough to require living wills. So
there is a connection in the sense that you might require even more than the
garden variety separation offered by ring fencing in the case of an institution
than you require to compose a plausible living will.
Liikanen's third recommendation is that institutions rely more heavily on
various kinds of so-called 'bail-in' lending or debt - a variation on tool (3)
concerning capital buffers.125 There are two reasons. The first is to enhance
the capital buffer. In addition to having the equity buffer that ordinary capital
regulation would require, for example, E.U. member jurisdictions would make
more granular prescriptions with respect to the kind of Tier 2 capital or the
kinds of debt capitalization or financing of which firms would avail
themselves. 126
The second reason for encouraging 'bail in' is to make the incentives on
the part of those creditors a bit more dramatic. The hope would be that
those creditors would prevail upon institutions to be a bit more careful and
assume less risk. This justification of course relies upon certain assumptions
concerning the practical governance of financial institutions that might and
might not be plausible in particular jurisdictions. In any event, the focus on
governance is not part of the macroprudential toolkit as such, however well
advised or otherwise it might be. In fact, it has long been recommended as a
microprudential measure.
Liikanen's fourth proposal is a grab-bag of recommendations that has
analogs in both the U.S. and the U.K. as discussed above: for example, more
robust risk-weighting standards - another instance of the perennial effort to
head-off gaming of capital standards.1 2 In addition, attention to leverage,
leverage ratios, maturity mismatch, and reliance on short-term funding figure
Commission's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRR). The resolution authority
should request wider separation than considered mandatory above if this is deemed
necessary to ensure resolvability and operational continuity of critical functions.").
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. (stating that "[T]he Group proposes to apply more robust risk weights in the
determination of minimum capital standards and more consistent treatment of risk in
internal models.").
127 Id.
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prominently - the kinds of concerns that have been discussed increasingly
here in the States under the rubric of so-called 'shadow banking.'128 In
essence, then, these are tool (1) through (4) recommendations.
Finally, Lilkanen's fifth recommendation is that corporate governance
provisions be looked at more carefully in the case of financial institutions. In
particular, the Report suggests that there should be more powerful and more
attentive risk management functions within institutions, as well as more
power on the part of the boards to prevail on management not to take
excessive risks.
As noted above, these are not, strictly speaking, tools in the emergent
macroprudential toolkit, important though they might be. Indeed they are at
least as microprudential in orientation as they are macroprudential. Hence
readers are referred to the vast literature, most of the recent such associated
with John Bogle's spirited arguments here in the U.S., on the importance of
internal governance to internal risk-taking by financial institutions and indeed
firms more broadly.
CONCLUSION
We've covered a good bit of ground here, and had best close before we
grow tedious. Suffice it to say that the project of macroprudential finance-
oversight, puzzlingly controversial as it was prior to 2008, is well underway at
long last. This is much to be welcomed. Much more remains to be done,
however. Regulators and, indeed, legislatures must address and resolve the
multiple legal challenges raised by the project as elaborated above.
They must also, ultimately, do the same at the global jurisdictional level.
For all of the domestic spillovers that warrant macroprudential oversight
within national jurisdictions operate also across borders. Transnational
macroprudential cooperation, moreover, will implicate new constitutional and
international-legal issues and tradeoffs of its own, even if many of these are
already familiar since the days of the first Basle Capital Accords reached in
1988.
I shall trust, however, that the domestic aspects of macroprudential
finance-regulation just elaborated suffice for the time being. Fuller
elaboration of the cross-border piece of the story, some of it already covered
in prior work by the author,129 will await the sequel.
128 Id.
129 See Hockett, Macro to Micro to Mission-Creep, supra note 15 and Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0,
supra note 8.
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